Trechos de The Kaiser's Memoirs (1922), de Wilhelm II.
After the arrival of the news of the assassination of my friend, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the regatta week and went back home, since I intended to go to Vienna for his funeral. But I was asked from there to give up this plan.
- - -
Tsar Nicholas, who helped prepare the World War and had already ordered mobilization, wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest, warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly for the first time the colossal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself by his warlike preparations. Therefore, he wished to stop the war machine, the murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in motion. This would have been possible and peace might have been preserved if Sazonoff had not frustrated his wish.
- - -
When our troops advanced in 1914 they found, in northern France and along the Belgian frontier, great stores of English soldiers' greatcoats. According to statements by the inhabitants, these were placed there during the last years of peace. Most of the English infantrymen who were made prisoners by us in the summer of 1914 had no greatcoats; when asked why, they answered, quite naïvely: "We are to find our greatcoats in the stores at Maubeuge, Le Quesnoy, etc., in the north of France and in Belgium."
- - -
Among the statesmen who, besides Poincaré, particularly helped unleash the World War, the Sazonoff-Isvolsky group probably should take first rank. Isvolsky, it is said, when at Paris, proudly placed his hand upon his breast and declared: "I made the war. Je suis le père de cette guerre." ("I am the father of this war")
[Théophile] Delcassé also has a large share in the guilt for the World War, and [Edward] Grey an even larger share, since he was the spiritual leader of the "encirclement policy," which he faithfully pushed forward and brought to completion, as the "legacy" of his dead sovereign [Edward VII].
- - -
I have been informed that an important rôle was played in the preparation of the World War directed against the monarchical Central Powers by the policy of the international "Great Orient Lodge"; a policy extending over many years and always envisaging the goal at which it aimed.
- - -
Finally, I suggested that the Pope should make an effort, seeing that my peace offer of December 12, 1916, had been rejected in such an unprecedented manner.
- - -
Here the chaplain interposed that such a step by the Pope was absolutely out of the question, since it would entail consequences which might be actually dangerous to the Vatican; the Government would at once mobilize the "piazza" ("man in the street") against the Vatican, and the Vatican certainly could not expose itself to that.
- - -
Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us, made her first separate peace offer, which set the ball rolling. The Emperor Charles had indeed got into touch secretly with the Entente and had long since resolved to abandon us. He acted according to the plan which he had explained thus to his entourage: "When I go to the Germans, I agree to everything they say, and when I return home, I do whatever I please."
- - -
After our failure of August 8th, General Ludendorff had declared that he could no longer guarantee a military victory. Therefore, the preparation of peace negotiations was necessary. Since diplomacy had not succeeded in initiating any promising negotiations and the military situation had become even worse in the meantime, on account of revolutionary agitation, Ludendorff, on the 29th of September, demanded that preparations be made for an armistice instead of for peace negotiations.
- - -
The army, to be sure, was no longer the old army. The new 1918 troops particularly were badly tainted with revolutionary propaganda and often took advantage of the darkness at night to sneak away from the firing and vanish to the rear.
But the majority of my divisions fought flawlessly to the very end and preserved their discipline and military spirit. To the very end they were always a match for the foe in morale; despite superiority in numbers, cannon, munitions, tanks, and airplanes, the foe invariably succumbed when he ran up against serious resistance. Therefore, the associations of our ex-fighters at the front are right in bearing upon their banners the motto: "Unbeaten on land and sea!"
- - -
He advised me to leave the army and go to some neutral country, for the purpose of avoiding such a "civil war."
[...] My departure brought us neither better armistice conditions nor better peace terms; nor did it prevent civil war - on the contrary, it hastened and intensified, in the most pernicious manner, the disintegration in the army and the nation.
- - -
It is futile to accuse Germany of war guilt. Today there is no longer any doubt that not Germany, but the alliance of her foes, prepared the war according to a definite plan, and intentionally caused it.
- - -
Had England been able, by introducing better commercial methods, to overcome or restrict German competition, she would have been quite within her rights in doing so and no objections could have been made. It simply would have been a case of the better man winning.
[...] On the other hand, it is quite another matter if one of these nations sees its assets on the world's balance sheet threatened by the industry, achievements, and super business methods of the other, and hence, not being able to apply ability like that of its young competitor, resorts to force - i. e., to methods that are not those of peace, but of war - in order to call a halt upon the other nation in its peaceful campaign of competition, or to annihilate it.
- - -
In France the idea of revenge had been sedulously cultivated ever since 1870-71; it was fostered, with every possible variation, in literary, political, and military writings, in the officer corps, in schools, associations, political circles. I can well understand this spirit. Looked at from the healthy national standpoint, it is, after all, more honorable for a nation to desire revenge for a blow received than to endure it without complaint.
But Alsace-Lorraine had been German soil for many centuries; it was stolen by France and taken back by us in 1871 as our property.
- - -
Another point was that Russia's enormous demand for loans was met almost exclusively by France; more than twenty billions of French gold francs found their way to Russia, and France had a voice, to some extent, in determining how they should be expended. As a result, it became entirely a matter of expenditure on strategic measures and preparations for war. The golden chain of the French billions not only bound Russia to France financially, but made Russia serve the French idea of revenge.
- - -
In the Algeciras Conference the outline of the Great War was already visible. It is assuredly not pleasant to be forced to retreat politically, as we did in the Morocco matter, but Germany's policy subordinated everything to the great cause of preserving the peace of the world.
- - -
But there can be no doubt that America's entry into the war, and the enormous supplies of ammunition, and especially of war materials, which preceded her entry, seriously hurt the chance of the Central Powers to bring the war to a successful termination by force of arms.
- - -
Never have I had warlike ambitions. In my youth my father had given me terrible descriptions of the battlefields of 1870 and 1871, and I felt no inclination to bring such misery, on a colossally larger scale, upon the German people and the whole of civilized mankind.
- - -
But war is a cruel thing and what matters in it is to win; after all, to fire heavy guns at civilized beings is not a pleasant matter, nor to bombard beautiful old towns, yet this had to be done by both sides in the war.
- - -
One must not be pharisaical, however; up to a certain point the extravagance of the terms imposed by the victor after a life-and-death struggle is a natural consequence of the relief felt at having escaped alive from deadly danger.
Nevertheless, I know that Germany, if we had emerged victorious from the war, would have imposed quite different terms - i. e., terms that would have been just and endurable. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest - which indeed are not at all comparable with the Treaty of Versailles - cannot be adduced against us. They were concluded in the very midst of the war and had to include conditions which would guarantee our safety until the end of the war. Had it come to a general peace, the treaty made by us in the East would have had a far different aspect; had we won the war, it would have been revised by ourselves. At the time it was made it was necessary to give preference to military requirements.
- - -
I do not care what my foes say about me. I do not recognize them as my judges. When I see how the same people who exaggeratedly spread incense before me in other days are now vilifying me, the most that I can feel is pity.
- - -
The present is a hard time for Germany. Of the future of this healthy, strong nation I do not despair. A nation which can achieve such an unprecedented rise as that of Germany between 1871 and 1914, a nation which can maintain itself successfully for over four years in a defensive war against twenty-eight nations, cannot be driven from the earth. Economically, the world cannot do without us.
- - -
The atmosphere of a victory does not last forever.
Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzbCh4c-8vA
http://royaltyguide.nl/families/hohenzollern/hhzemperors1.htm
http://blog.wrighthand.net/2012/02/the-hidden-hand-arm-of-history
- - -
Tsar Nicholas, who helped prepare the World War and had already ordered mobilization, wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest, warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly for the first time the colossal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself by his warlike preparations. Therefore, he wished to stop the war machine, the murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in motion. This would have been possible and peace might have been preserved if Sazonoff had not frustrated his wish.
- - -
When our troops advanced in 1914 they found, in northern France and along the Belgian frontier, great stores of English soldiers' greatcoats. According to statements by the inhabitants, these were placed there during the last years of peace. Most of the English infantrymen who were made prisoners by us in the summer of 1914 had no greatcoats; when asked why, they answered, quite naïvely: "We are to find our greatcoats in the stores at Maubeuge, Le Quesnoy, etc., in the north of France and in Belgium."
- - -
Among the statesmen who, besides Poincaré, particularly helped unleash the World War, the Sazonoff-Isvolsky group probably should take first rank. Isvolsky, it is said, when at Paris, proudly placed his hand upon his breast and declared: "I made the war. Je suis le père de cette guerre." ("I am the father of this war")
[Théophile] Delcassé also has a large share in the guilt for the World War, and [Edward] Grey an even larger share, since he was the spiritual leader of the "encirclement policy," which he faithfully pushed forward and brought to completion, as the "legacy" of his dead sovereign [Edward VII].
- - -
I have been informed that an important rôle was played in the preparation of the World War directed against the monarchical Central Powers by the policy of the international "Great Orient Lodge"; a policy extending over many years and always envisaging the goal at which it aimed.
- - -
Finally, I suggested that the Pope should make an effort, seeing that my peace offer of December 12, 1916, had been rejected in such an unprecedented manner.
- - -
Here the chaplain interposed that such a step by the Pope was absolutely out of the question, since it would entail consequences which might be actually dangerous to the Vatican; the Government would at once mobilize the "piazza" ("man in the street") against the Vatican, and the Vatican certainly could not expose itself to that.
- - -
Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us, made her first separate peace offer, which set the ball rolling. The Emperor Charles had indeed got into touch secretly with the Entente and had long since resolved to abandon us. He acted according to the plan which he had explained thus to his entourage: "When I go to the Germans, I agree to everything they say, and when I return home, I do whatever I please."
- - -
After our failure of August 8th, General Ludendorff had declared that he could no longer guarantee a military victory. Therefore, the preparation of peace negotiations was necessary. Since diplomacy had not succeeded in initiating any promising negotiations and the military situation had become even worse in the meantime, on account of revolutionary agitation, Ludendorff, on the 29th of September, demanded that preparations be made for an armistice instead of for peace negotiations.
- - -
The army, to be sure, was no longer the old army. The new 1918 troops particularly were badly tainted with revolutionary propaganda and often took advantage of the darkness at night to sneak away from the firing and vanish to the rear.
But the majority of my divisions fought flawlessly to the very end and preserved their discipline and military spirit. To the very end they were always a match for the foe in morale; despite superiority in numbers, cannon, munitions, tanks, and airplanes, the foe invariably succumbed when he ran up against serious resistance. Therefore, the associations of our ex-fighters at the front are right in bearing upon their banners the motto: "Unbeaten on land and sea!"
- - -
He advised me to leave the army and go to some neutral country, for the purpose of avoiding such a "civil war."
[...] My departure brought us neither better armistice conditions nor better peace terms; nor did it prevent civil war - on the contrary, it hastened and intensified, in the most pernicious manner, the disintegration in the army and the nation.
- - -
It is futile to accuse Germany of war guilt. Today there is no longer any doubt that not Germany, but the alliance of her foes, prepared the war according to a definite plan, and intentionally caused it.
- - -
Had England been able, by introducing better commercial methods, to overcome or restrict German competition, she would have been quite within her rights in doing so and no objections could have been made. It simply would have been a case of the better man winning.
[...] On the other hand, it is quite another matter if one of these nations sees its assets on the world's balance sheet threatened by the industry, achievements, and super business methods of the other, and hence, not being able to apply ability like that of its young competitor, resorts to force - i. e., to methods that are not those of peace, but of war - in order to call a halt upon the other nation in its peaceful campaign of competition, or to annihilate it.
- - -
In France the idea of revenge had been sedulously cultivated ever since 1870-71; it was fostered, with every possible variation, in literary, political, and military writings, in the officer corps, in schools, associations, political circles. I can well understand this spirit. Looked at from the healthy national standpoint, it is, after all, more honorable for a nation to desire revenge for a blow received than to endure it without complaint.
But Alsace-Lorraine had been German soil for many centuries; it was stolen by France and taken back by us in 1871 as our property.
- - -
Another point was that Russia's enormous demand for loans was met almost exclusively by France; more than twenty billions of French gold francs found their way to Russia, and France had a voice, to some extent, in determining how they should be expended. As a result, it became entirely a matter of expenditure on strategic measures and preparations for war. The golden chain of the French billions not only bound Russia to France financially, but made Russia serve the French idea of revenge.
- - -
In the Algeciras Conference the outline of the Great War was already visible. It is assuredly not pleasant to be forced to retreat politically, as we did in the Morocco matter, but Germany's policy subordinated everything to the great cause of preserving the peace of the world.
- - -
But there can be no doubt that America's entry into the war, and the enormous supplies of ammunition, and especially of war materials, which preceded her entry, seriously hurt the chance of the Central Powers to bring the war to a successful termination by force of arms.
- - -
Never have I had warlike ambitions. In my youth my father had given me terrible descriptions of the battlefields of 1870 and 1871, and I felt no inclination to bring such misery, on a colossally larger scale, upon the German people and the whole of civilized mankind.
- - -
But war is a cruel thing and what matters in it is to win; after all, to fire heavy guns at civilized beings is not a pleasant matter, nor to bombard beautiful old towns, yet this had to be done by both sides in the war.
- - -
One must not be pharisaical, however; up to a certain point the extravagance of the terms imposed by the victor after a life-and-death struggle is a natural consequence of the relief felt at having escaped alive from deadly danger.
Nevertheless, I know that Germany, if we had emerged victorious from the war, would have imposed quite different terms - i. e., terms that would have been just and endurable. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest - which indeed are not at all comparable with the Treaty of Versailles - cannot be adduced against us. They were concluded in the very midst of the war and had to include conditions which would guarantee our safety until the end of the war. Had it come to a general peace, the treaty made by us in the East would have had a far different aspect; had we won the war, it would have been revised by ourselves. At the time it was made it was necessary to give preference to military requirements.
- - -
I do not care what my foes say about me. I do not recognize them as my judges. When I see how the same people who exaggeratedly spread incense before me in other days are now vilifying me, the most that I can feel is pity.
- - -
The present is a hard time for Germany. Of the future of this healthy, strong nation I do not despair. A nation which can achieve such an unprecedented rise as that of Germany between 1871 and 1914, a nation which can maintain itself successfully for over four years in a defensive war against twenty-eight nations, cannot be driven from the earth. Economically, the world cannot do without us.
- - -
The atmosphere of a victory does not last forever.
Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzbCh4c-8vA
http://royaltyguide.nl/families/hohenzollern/hhzemperors1.htm
http://blog.wrighthand.net/2012/02/the-hidden-hand-arm-of-history
