[Paleta de Narmer]
Trechos de The Great War: A Combat History Of The First World War (2013), de Peter Hart.
Falling into his own trap, Ludendorff triggered Operation Gneisenau to widen the salient from Noyon to Montdidier with an attack launched at 24.00 on 8 June. At first the Germans were successful, over-running the Forward Zone on 9 June and pushing forward some four miles. Then it was the same old story as the French managed to stabilise the front. But something new emerged on 11 June, when the French launched a counterattack under General Charles Mangin driving into the western flank of the burgeoning salient. The French were using their own shock tactics as they attacked without a preliminary barrage to preserve surprise, utilised a deadly creeping barrage, with close support for the assaulting troops from large numbers of Renault FT tanks and ground-strafing aircraft. Stymied again, Ludendorff was forced to suspend the attacks. If the Germans ever had a real chance of winning the war on the Western Front in 1918, then now it had passed. The arrival of summer brought with it an accelerating stream of fresh American divisions on to the Western Front. Although unused to modern warfare, they represented the end of hope for the German Army.
Ludendorff was caught in a cleft stick. He could stand back on the defensive and prolong the war as long as possible; or he could make one last grab for outright victory. He decided to launch his Friedensturm - Peace Offensive - with an all-out attack on the French and the Americans with the Seventh, First and Third Armies from Servon to Château-Thierry in what would become known as the Second Battle of the Marne. Once the French were defeated Ludendorff resolved to turn for the final decisive battle with the British in Flanders. But the French easily detected the precursors of this huge offensive and were ready and waiting: the German methodology was now fully understood. Indeed, before the German bombardment opened up at 00.10 on 15 July, the French front lines were cleared to avoid casualties, while the massed French guns actually opened up their fire first, flaying the German gun batteries and crashing down on the infantry as they moved up for the assault planned to commence after 04.15. It was the start of a very bad day for the German Army. In the sector manned by Captain Jesse Woolridge the Germans attempted a crossing of the Marne on pontoons and a floating bridge.
- - -
It was the severest defeat of the war! One only had to descend the northern slopes of the Marne: never have I seen so many dead, nor such frightful sights in battle. The Americans on the other shore had completely shot to pieces in a close combat two of our companies. They had lain in the grain, in semicircular formation, had let us approach, and then from 30 to 50 feet had shot almost all of us down. This foe had nerves, one must allow him this boast; but he also showed a bestial brutality. 'The Americans kill everything!' That was the cry of horror of 15 July, which long took hold of our men. A day like 15 July affects body and nerves for weeks. Our lines were thinned. Low spirits took hold of most of the men. (Lieutenant Kurt Hesse, 5th Grenadier Regiment)
Then came the main French riposte, commencing just three days later, on 18 July. Foch determined to strike hard at Soissons, augmenting his Sixth and Tenth Armies with four divisions from the AEF, thereby threatening the whole bloated Marne Salient carved out by Operation Blücher. This was a mighty assault led by Mangin's Tenth Army backed by over 1,500 guns and some 300 tanks. There would be no preliminary barrage, just a huge creeping barrage, a mixture of high explosive, shrapnel and smoke shells rolling along ahead of the attacking infantry, designed to blast, kill or blind the German machine gunners.
- - -
As the barrage rolled forward the massed Renault, St Chamand and Schneider tanks crushed their way through the barbed wire. Of course, not everything went smoothly; in particular, the Americans found it difficult to fit in with the French plans and working methods, which led to a degree of confusion.
- - -
Communications difficulties were particularly evident when French tanks, Senegalese infantry and American soldiers found themselves fighting in the same patch of ground.
- - -
But, for all the problems, the French and Americans drove back the Germans. The Renault tanks made a real difference, swarming over the battlefield, taking out German machine gun posts and generally assisting the infantry, with their fully rotating turret making them flexible in selecting targets. Although their small size precluded them crossing trenches, they were meant to work in tandem with sappers or specially trained infantry using picks and shovels to break down the trench walls and smooth out the way. As can be imagined, such arrangements did not often stand up to the test of battle. Like the British, the French would also find that the combination of high casualties, mechanical breakdowns and crew exhaustion meant that tank units melted away after a day or so in action.
- - -
The Germans could not withstand the pressure and fell back towards the Aisne River. By 7 August all their gains from their 27 May offensive had been lost. Finally, Ludendorff was forced to face the fact that he no longer had the forces available to launch a viable offensive and would be on the defensive for the foreseeable future. His whole strategy for 1918 lay in ruins and defeat beckoned, no longer whispering softly, but shouting from the rooftops.
- - -
General Sir Henry Rawlinson became aware that his German opponents were adopting a strangely placid role, failing to build up their defences in depth, indeed failing to build any proper defences at all. This was characteristic of a general decline in German military efficiency. Many of the better divisions had already been moved south, sucked into the great offensives against the French, while the best men from the divisions that remained had already been filtered out to restock the stormtrooper units. The remnants were in poor shape, unrecognisable from the German formations of earlier in the war. The failure to achieve a decisive victory coupled with the arrival of the American legions had undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to German morale.
[...] The German Army was near to breaking point.
- - -
Tempted by the apparently frail nature of the German defences he was presented with, Rawlinson asked Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, commanding the Australian Corps, to prepare an exploratory local attack. Monash and his staff planned a line-straightening operation for the village of Hamel, to be launched at 03.10 on 4 July 1918. The tactics employed reflected the shift from manpower to firepower, a shift that had been gradually forced upon the British Army, but which was now wholeheartedly embraced in the concept of the 'All Arms Battle'. The attack proved a stunning success achieving an advance of 2,000 yards.
- - -
The enfeebled German Army was in no fit state to withstand this kind of focussed onslaught.
Bolstered by this triumph, Rawlinson began to plan a much bigger battle to capitalise on the German weakness using a further development of the self-same tactics. But this was emphatically not the work of one man, or even of a small group of officers, but rather the synthesis of all that the British - aided by the French - had learnt over the previous three years, since the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. It was a collegiate effort, marked by the wholehearted involvement of experts at all levels of the BEF and fully integrating all the new weapons into one ferocious methodology of modern war. The guns of the Royal Artillery remained the backbone of the assault. A total of 1,386 carefully calibrated field guns and howitzers, with a further 684 heavy artillery pieces, were moved in secretly, their ammunition dumps stocked to the brim. The RAF, aided by flash spotters and sound rangers, had already managed to identify 504 of the 530 German guns. When the attack was launched, they would be neutralised by lashings of gas and high explosive shells to prevent them intervening as the infantry crossed No Man's Land. There was no longer any need to decide between counter-battery fire and a barrage: the BEF now had enough guns to allow for both with a comprehensive creeping barrage, forcing the Germans to keep their heads down as the British infantry approached. With them came the tanks: 324 heavy tanks to squash the barbed wire and help crush any surviving German strongpoints; then 96 light Whippet tanks to create havoc behind the German lines; while a further 120 supply tanks were loaded with munitions to resupply the infantry in case of German counter-attacks. This would be the biggest tank attack of the war. Above them flew the aircraft, strafing the battlefield and making contact reports to record progress, attacking airfields to neutralise their opposite numbers and launching interdiction bombing missions against rail junctions, arterial roads and key bridges. The infantry themselves were unrecognisable from the warriors of 1915. Fewer in number, perhaps, but covered by massed Vickers machine gun fire and carrying their own Lewis guns, Stokes mortars and rifle grenades for immediate powerful support. Furthermore, they no longer advanced in lines, but in "short worms" of about eight men feeling their way in "strings" across No Man's Land preceded by well-trained scouts.
- - -
As the infantry attacked, helped by the cover of fog, they were simply unstoppable.
- - -
Despite the faltering of the British III Corps on the left flank, where a difficult ground configuration hindered progress, the Canadian and Australian Corps both had stunning successes, advancing up to eight miles across a 10-mile-wide frontage.
- - -
[...] a disaster that Ludendorff could not deny: "August 8 was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war."
- - -
Over the next few days, the British and French continued to move forward, although the law of diminishing returns stalked their steps. The artillery were dislocated, communications were soon disrupted resulting in confusion in command and control, the infantry were becoming increasingly tired, the mechanically unreliable tanks broke down and the supply lines were stretched. Meanwhile, the Germans moved their reserves forward, stiffening the line and occupying the old trench lines that littered the whole Somme area. [...] A classic confrontation ensued in which Foch tried to order the implacable Haig to bend to his will. He soon found that, Supreme Commander or not, he did not have the right to control British tactical deployments.
- - -
[...] the Battle of Amiens ended after just three days on 11 August 1918. A total advance of twelve miles had been achieved, but what really mattered was the severe body blow it had inflicted on the German Army.
- - -
[...] the Germans could not sustain this level of sacrifice. Ludendorff could see the writing on the wall.
- - -
Yet even so there was much hard fighting to go. The German Army was still a deadly enemy and open warfare, desired for so long, was a cruel mistress.
- - -
The key battle took place at Mont St Quentin, a mile to the north of Peronne. The Australians crossed the river and tore into the German positions, taking the hill on 31 August, only to be ejected by a German counter-attack. Next day there was no mistake as the Australians swept over to a glorious victory which at a stroke broke the integrity of the German line along the Somme. But the Germans were now being thrown back everywhere.
- - -
[...] the launch, on 12 September, of the first fully fledged offensive by the Americans, on the St Mihiel Salient. It was the supreme learning experience for the inexperienced Americans, who had to master all the myriad disciplines of an offensive under the stressful conditions of modern warfare. The barrage was ferocious, although here the Americans had wisely leaned on French artillery expertise and support.
- - -
The advance was a relatively easy triumph for the AEF as the Germans had been preparing in any event to evacuate the salient. But the Americans had achieved their objectives and gained experience that would stand them in good stead for greater trials.
Haig was determined to defeat the Germans in 1918. He had an all too painful familiarity with their ability to regenerate their forces and stabilise their defensive positions if given half a chance. Faced by the imposing fortifications of the Hindenburg Line he had the choice of attacking that autumn or suspending operations and attempting the same task in the spring of 1919. Fortunately, in Foch Haig had a superior who, after their initial confrontation, shared the same overall vision of the war; a man equally determined not to allow the Germans breathing space. Foch brilliantly co-ordinated the attacks up and down the Western Front: on the first day the French and Americans would strike hard in the Meuse-Argonne area, the very next day the British would launch their First and Third Armies at the Hindenburg Line attacking towards Cambrai. The day after the French, the Belgians and the British Second Army would attack in Flanders. Finally on the fourth day, a fourth offensive as the British Fourth Army would attack the Hindenburg Line in the Somme region. Blessed with a plentiful supply of guns and ammunition, Foch could attack anywhere he liked. Instead of persisting where the Germans were focussing their efforts and amassing reserves, he could switch away to where they were not so well prepared.
- - -
The "Doughboys", as the Americans were nicknamed, fought well and managed to advance some seven miles before they bcame bogged down in the tangle of woods, ridges and valleys that make the Argonne Forest area ideal for defence. The fighting was an intensive, brutal experience for them against a German Army that may have been on its last legs but was still dangerous when cornered. All the same, the Americans endured, pushing on from ridge to ridge, grinding their way through the Argonne, their very presence and ever-growing strength a constant reminder to the Germans that there could be no escape from defeat. The fighting would continue with only short lulls throughout October and into November 1918.
- - -
The American II Corps, placed for the occasion under the command of Monash, would attack where the St Quentin Canal ran underground between Bellicourt and Vendhuile. The Australian Corps would be ready to exploit any success.
[...] An ordinary British division with no great pedigree had achieved a dramatic feat of arms that would surely have been impossible earlier in the war. The Fourth Army had completely ruptured the Hindenburg Line and the advance on the German borders had begun. The deep-flowing Rhine might threaten to hold them up but the Allies had won the war, the only question was whether they could finish it in 1918.
- - -
With the capitulation of Bulgaria on 30 September, Turkey on 30 October, and the Austro-Hungarian acceptance of an armistice on the Italian Front on 3 November, Germany was left fighting alone and without hope.
- - -
The final Allied offensives began on 4 November.
[...] For the British there was a peculiar irony in the site chosen by the German Seventeenth Army for a rearguard stand on 10 November: the Mons area where for the BEF it had all begun, thousands of lifetimes ago. By 04.30 on 11 November the Canadians had cleared away the last of the Germans and Mons was returned to British control. They were truly back where they started.
- - -
[...] at the Army Headquarters at Spa in Belgium the Kaiser was being given a stern lesson in reality by General Wilhelm Groener, who suggested that Wilhelm II go to the front and die at the head of his armies, an invitation politely declined by the Kaiser, who instead chose ignominious exile in the Netherlands, crossing the border on 10 November. His more formal abdication would occur on 28 November, but to all intents and purposes Germany was now a republic.
- - -
The German delegation finally met Foch in the inauspicious surroundings of a railway carriage in Compiègne Forest, where he gave them no real choice but to sign, which they duly did at 05.15 on the morning of 11 November, allowing just a few hours before the Armistice was promulgated to the world commencing at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month.
Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s6DERzglY1g
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Revolution_of_1918–19
Trechos de The Great War: A Combat History Of The First World War (2013), de Peter Hart.
 |
Ludendorff was caught in a cleft stick. He could stand back on the defensive and prolong the war as long as possible; or he could make one last grab for outright victory. He decided to launch his Friedensturm - Peace Offensive - with an all-out attack on the French and the Americans with the Seventh, First and Third Armies from Servon to Château-Thierry in what would become known as the Second Battle of the Marne. Once the French were defeated Ludendorff resolved to turn for the final decisive battle with the British in Flanders. But the French easily detected the precursors of this huge offensive and were ready and waiting: the German methodology was now fully understood. Indeed, before the German bombardment opened up at 00.10 on 15 July, the French front lines were cleared to avoid casualties, while the massed French guns actually opened up their fire first, flaying the German gun batteries and crashing down on the infantry as they moved up for the assault planned to commence after 04.15. It was the start of a very bad day for the German Army. In the sector manned by Captain Jesse Woolridge the Germans attempted a crossing of the Marne on pontoons and a floating bridge.
- - -
It was the severest defeat of the war! One only had to descend the northern slopes of the Marne: never have I seen so many dead, nor such frightful sights in battle. The Americans on the other shore had completely shot to pieces in a close combat two of our companies. They had lain in the grain, in semicircular formation, had let us approach, and then from 30 to 50 feet had shot almost all of us down. This foe had nerves, one must allow him this boast; but he also showed a bestial brutality. 'The Americans kill everything!' That was the cry of horror of 15 July, which long took hold of our men. A day like 15 July affects body and nerves for weeks. Our lines were thinned. Low spirits took hold of most of the men. (Lieutenant Kurt Hesse, 5th Grenadier Regiment)
Then came the main French riposte, commencing just three days later, on 18 July. Foch determined to strike hard at Soissons, augmenting his Sixth and Tenth Armies with four divisions from the AEF, thereby threatening the whole bloated Marne Salient carved out by Operation Blücher. This was a mighty assault led by Mangin's Tenth Army backed by over 1,500 guns and some 300 tanks. There would be no preliminary barrage, just a huge creeping barrage, a mixture of high explosive, shrapnel and smoke shells rolling along ahead of the attacking infantry, designed to blast, kill or blind the German machine gunners.
- - -
As the barrage rolled forward the massed Renault, St Chamand and Schneider tanks crushed their way through the barbed wire. Of course, not everything went smoothly; in particular, the Americans found it difficult to fit in with the French plans and working methods, which led to a degree of confusion.
- - -
Communications difficulties were particularly evident when French tanks, Senegalese infantry and American soldiers found themselves fighting in the same patch of ground.
- - -
But, for all the problems, the French and Americans drove back the Germans. The Renault tanks made a real difference, swarming over the battlefield, taking out German machine gun posts and generally assisting the infantry, with their fully rotating turret making them flexible in selecting targets. Although their small size precluded them crossing trenches, they were meant to work in tandem with sappers or specially trained infantry using picks and shovels to break down the trench walls and smooth out the way. As can be imagined, such arrangements did not often stand up to the test of battle. Like the British, the French would also find that the combination of high casualties, mechanical breakdowns and crew exhaustion meant that tank units melted away after a day or so in action.
- - -
The Germans could not withstand the pressure and fell back towards the Aisne River. By 7 August all their gains from their 27 May offensive had been lost. Finally, Ludendorff was forced to face the fact that he no longer had the forces available to launch a viable offensive and would be on the defensive for the foreseeable future. His whole strategy for 1918 lay in ruins and defeat beckoned, no longer whispering softly, but shouting from the rooftops.
- - -
General Sir Henry Rawlinson became aware that his German opponents were adopting a strangely placid role, failing to build up their defences in depth, indeed failing to build any proper defences at all. This was characteristic of a general decline in German military efficiency. Many of the better divisions had already been moved south, sucked into the great offensives against the French, while the best men from the divisions that remained had already been filtered out to restock the stormtrooper units. The remnants were in poor shape, unrecognisable from the German formations of earlier in the war. The failure to achieve a decisive victory coupled with the arrival of the American legions had undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to German morale.
[...] The German Army was near to breaking point.
- - -
Tempted by the apparently frail nature of the German defences he was presented with, Rawlinson asked Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, commanding the Australian Corps, to prepare an exploratory local attack. Monash and his staff planned a line-straightening operation for the village of Hamel, to be launched at 03.10 on 4 July 1918. The tactics employed reflected the shift from manpower to firepower, a shift that had been gradually forced upon the British Army, but which was now wholeheartedly embraced in the concept of the 'All Arms Battle'. The attack proved a stunning success achieving an advance of 2,000 yards.
- - -
The enfeebled German Army was in no fit state to withstand this kind of focussed onslaught.
Bolstered by this triumph, Rawlinson began to plan a much bigger battle to capitalise on the German weakness using a further development of the self-same tactics. But this was emphatically not the work of one man, or even of a small group of officers, but rather the synthesis of all that the British - aided by the French - had learnt over the previous three years, since the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. It was a collegiate effort, marked by the wholehearted involvement of experts at all levels of the BEF and fully integrating all the new weapons into one ferocious methodology of modern war. The guns of the Royal Artillery remained the backbone of the assault. A total of 1,386 carefully calibrated field guns and howitzers, with a further 684 heavy artillery pieces, were moved in secretly, their ammunition dumps stocked to the brim. The RAF, aided by flash spotters and sound rangers, had already managed to identify 504 of the 530 German guns. When the attack was launched, they would be neutralised by lashings of gas and high explosive shells to prevent them intervening as the infantry crossed No Man's Land. There was no longer any need to decide between counter-battery fire and a barrage: the BEF now had enough guns to allow for both with a comprehensive creeping barrage, forcing the Germans to keep their heads down as the British infantry approached. With them came the tanks: 324 heavy tanks to squash the barbed wire and help crush any surviving German strongpoints; then 96 light Whippet tanks to create havoc behind the German lines; while a further 120 supply tanks were loaded with munitions to resupply the infantry in case of German counter-attacks. This would be the biggest tank attack of the war. Above them flew the aircraft, strafing the battlefield and making contact reports to record progress, attacking airfields to neutralise their opposite numbers and launching interdiction bombing missions against rail junctions, arterial roads and key bridges. The infantry themselves were unrecognisable from the warriors of 1915. Fewer in number, perhaps, but covered by massed Vickers machine gun fire and carrying their own Lewis guns, Stokes mortars and rifle grenades for immediate powerful support. Furthermore, they no longer advanced in lines, but in "short worms" of about eight men feeling their way in "strings" across No Man's Land preceded by well-trained scouts.
- - -
As the infantry attacked, helped by the cover of fog, they were simply unstoppable.
- - -
Despite the faltering of the British III Corps on the left flank, where a difficult ground configuration hindered progress, the Canadian and Australian Corps both had stunning successes, advancing up to eight miles across a 10-mile-wide frontage.
- - -
[...] a disaster that Ludendorff could not deny: "August 8 was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war."
- - -
Over the next few days, the British and French continued to move forward, although the law of diminishing returns stalked their steps. The artillery were dislocated, communications were soon disrupted resulting in confusion in command and control, the infantry were becoming increasingly tired, the mechanically unreliable tanks broke down and the supply lines were stretched. Meanwhile, the Germans moved their reserves forward, stiffening the line and occupying the old trench lines that littered the whole Somme area. [...] A classic confrontation ensued in which Foch tried to order the implacable Haig to bend to his will. He soon found that, Supreme Commander or not, he did not have the right to control British tactical deployments.
- - -
[...] the Battle of Amiens ended after just three days on 11 August 1918. A total advance of twelve miles had been achieved, but what really mattered was the severe body blow it had inflicted on the German Army.
- - -
[...] the Germans could not sustain this level of sacrifice. Ludendorff could see the writing on the wall.
- - -
Yet even so there was much hard fighting to go. The German Army was still a deadly enemy and open warfare, desired for so long, was a cruel mistress.
- - -
The key battle took place at Mont St Quentin, a mile to the north of Peronne. The Australians crossed the river and tore into the German positions, taking the hill on 31 August, only to be ejected by a German counter-attack. Next day there was no mistake as the Australians swept over to a glorious victory which at a stroke broke the integrity of the German line along the Somme. But the Germans were now being thrown back everywhere.
- - -
[...] the launch, on 12 September, of the first fully fledged offensive by the Americans, on the St Mihiel Salient. It was the supreme learning experience for the inexperienced Americans, who had to master all the myriad disciplines of an offensive under the stressful conditions of modern warfare. The barrage was ferocious, although here the Americans had wisely leaned on French artillery expertise and support.
- - -
The advance was a relatively easy triumph for the AEF as the Germans had been preparing in any event to evacuate the salient. But the Americans had achieved their objectives and gained experience that would stand them in good stead for greater trials.
Haig was determined to defeat the Germans in 1918. He had an all too painful familiarity with their ability to regenerate their forces and stabilise their defensive positions if given half a chance. Faced by the imposing fortifications of the Hindenburg Line he had the choice of attacking that autumn or suspending operations and attempting the same task in the spring of 1919. Fortunately, in Foch Haig had a superior who, after their initial confrontation, shared the same overall vision of the war; a man equally determined not to allow the Germans breathing space. Foch brilliantly co-ordinated the attacks up and down the Western Front: on the first day the French and Americans would strike hard in the Meuse-Argonne area, the very next day the British would launch their First and Third Armies at the Hindenburg Line attacking towards Cambrai. The day after the French, the Belgians and the British Second Army would attack in Flanders. Finally on the fourth day, a fourth offensive as the British Fourth Army would attack the Hindenburg Line in the Somme region. Blessed with a plentiful supply of guns and ammunition, Foch could attack anywhere he liked. Instead of persisting where the Germans were focussing their efforts and amassing reserves, he could switch away to where they were not so well prepared.
- - -
The "Doughboys", as the Americans were nicknamed, fought well and managed to advance some seven miles before they bcame bogged down in the tangle of woods, ridges and valleys that make the Argonne Forest area ideal for defence. The fighting was an intensive, brutal experience for them against a German Army that may have been on its last legs but was still dangerous when cornered. All the same, the Americans endured, pushing on from ridge to ridge, grinding their way through the Argonne, their very presence and ever-growing strength a constant reminder to the Germans that there could be no escape from defeat. The fighting would continue with only short lulls throughout October and into November 1918.
- - -
The American II Corps, placed for the occasion under the command of Monash, would attack where the St Quentin Canal ran underground between Bellicourt and Vendhuile. The Australian Corps would be ready to exploit any success.
[...] An ordinary British division with no great pedigree had achieved a dramatic feat of arms that would surely have been impossible earlier in the war. The Fourth Army had completely ruptured the Hindenburg Line and the advance on the German borders had begun. The deep-flowing Rhine might threaten to hold them up but the Allies had won the war, the only question was whether they could finish it in 1918.
- - -
With the capitulation of Bulgaria on 30 September, Turkey on 30 October, and the Austro-Hungarian acceptance of an armistice on the Italian Front on 3 November, Germany was left fighting alone and without hope.
- - -
The final Allied offensives began on 4 November.
[...] For the British there was a peculiar irony in the site chosen by the German Seventeenth Army for a rearguard stand on 10 November: the Mons area where for the BEF it had all begun, thousands of lifetimes ago. By 04.30 on 11 November the Canadians had cleared away the last of the Germans and Mons was returned to British control. They were truly back where they started.
- - -
[...] at the Army Headquarters at Spa in Belgium the Kaiser was being given a stern lesson in reality by General Wilhelm Groener, who suggested that Wilhelm II go to the front and die at the head of his armies, an invitation politely declined by the Kaiser, who instead chose ignominious exile in the Netherlands, crossing the border on 10 November. His more formal abdication would occur on 28 November, but to all intents and purposes Germany was now a republic.
- - -
The German delegation finally met Foch in the inauspicious surroundings of a railway carriage in Compiègne Forest, where he gave them no real choice but to sign, which they duly did at 05.15 on the morning of 11 November, allowing just a few hours before the Armistice was promulgated to the world commencing at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month.
Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s6DERzglY1g
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Revolution_of_1918–19
