Great Retreat

By 23 August 1915 the Russian positions on their fronts with the Central Powers of Austria-Hungary and Germany were crumbling like mud walls in a rainstorm. Since April, the combined armies had slowly and methodically destroyed one Russian corps after another as they marched across the Polish salient and through the Carpathian Mountains. The strong fortresses of the Vistula River had succumbed. Voices from the trenches to the desks of the Russian General Staff or Stavka whispered innuendos of betrayal and incompetence and called for something to be done before the German hordes gobbled up any more of holy mother Russia. Tsar Nicholas II, encouraged by his wife, finally gave in to the allegations and sacked the commander in chief, his uncle, Nicholas Nikolovich, and took up the reigns of command himself. This assumption of command on Nicholas's part was one of the contributing factors toward the Russian Revolution which followed a year and a half later.

Nicholas II had appointed his uncle Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolovich as the commander in chief of Russian forces at the beginning of the war in August 1914. In accordance with the Russian tradition that dated back to Alexander Nevsky, the Grand Duke had reluctantly accepted the appointment after numerous turn downs and wrenching self examinations. Nevertheless, shunning his self professed incompetence, he had launched the vast Russian army against both enemies nearly simultaneously in accordance with plans drawn up between 1910 and 1913 of which he had no prior knowledge. By September, the best laid plans had yielded disaster against the Germans but ripe fruit from the Austro-Hungarians.

Throughout 1914 and the winter months of 1915 the Russian army had fought stubbornly against the Germans maintaining their hold on the Polish salient that jutted like a knife at the throat of Germany. Three times the Germans had attempted to seize the fortress line along the Vistula, and three times the tsarist soldiers had defeated them. Three times the Grand Duke had attempted to invade Germany and each had failed. However, in Galicia, Russian General Alexei Brusilov had pushed his soldiers ever forward to take Lemberg, invest the fortress at Przemysl, and threaten the ancient Polish capital of Krakow and the coal rich German Silesia. His soldiers stood on the summits of the Carpathian Mountains and looked down into the Hungarian plains. The Austro-Hungarian army was hemorrhaging at an alarming rate. One year's casualties rose to nearly 1,500,000 men of which one third were prisoners of war. But the euphoria of victories and successful defenses came to a screeching stop in April 1915.

The Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, had asked the German chief of staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, for help in repelling Russian advances since the first month of the war. Falkenhayn had provided a division here and a brigade there to bolster the dual monarchy's failing lines and even formed two armies to secure its right flank in southern Poland and center in Galicia. Conrad's two attempts in late 1914 and winter 1915 at counter offenses had failed miserably and in March, the besieged men of the fortress of Przemysl had finally given up sending 130,000 men to the Russian prisoner of war camps. His requests for help to the Germans became more insistent. Falkenhayn answered the pleas by planning an offensive along the Galician front between the villages of Gorlice and Tarnow which German units would carry out exclusive of Austro-Hungarian control.

- - -
On 2 May the Central Powers' artillery opened fire on the soldiers in the juncture of the Russian IX and X Corps of the Third Army, a front that was approximately 50 kilometers long. The bombardment lasted a bare four hours but was of such a devastating nature that few survived it.

- - -
As the Russian Third Army fell back under the onslaught of the German heavy artillery so did its neighbors to the right and left. The general staff had a real fear of encirclement.

- - -
One reason why Stavka ordered a withdrawal was the condition of the armies' armaments and munitions. The Russian army had started the war with many deficits in this area. In artillery, bending to the concepts espoused by their French ally for a mobile war effort, the war ministry had decided to concentrate on producing light field pieces which soldiers could move forward quickly in a war of mobility. Larger calibers were seen as defensive weapons. As a result the Russian Third Army had no heavy artillery or were there any heavy pieces in the flanking armies. German heavy artillery, with a longer range than the Russian field pieces, took up position out of their range and pounded them into slag heaps. But the problem was not solely in a lack of cannon. It also resided in a lack of ammunition. [...] Scarcity showed itself by early 1915. Division commanders limited their batteries to using five to ten rounds per day per gun. This lack of ammunition had also reduced battery size from eight guns to six. Russian soldiers took note that the German cannonades were met with silence on the part of their supporting guns. Battery commanders were cautioned to open fire only when the infantry appeared. By then many batteries lay in ruin and the fire from the surviving cannons amounted to only a few salvos followed again by silence as they were either blown up by the heavier, longer range German cannons or because they left the field as useless pieces of war equipment. This shortage went deeper than just the artillery branch.

Another reason to consider an entire front withdrawal was the strength of the army. Casualties had topped the million mark during the early months of 1915. Officer losses by the end of 1914 exceeded the war's beginning strength plus 50 percent more and competent replacements were not coming. Those who had the necessary education avoided service through deferments and promotion from the ranks would have been counterproductive since over 50 percent of the soldiers were illiterate. Noncommissioned officers were in even shorter supply. Third Army's paper strength showed 232, 000 but those who bore the brunt of the Mackensen hammer only amounted to 92,800. Many of the regiments had fewer than 250 bayonets. The constant pleas for replacements from home depots led to recruits arriving in the trenches with as little as three weeks training and weaponless. Although the Russian army had started the war with enough rifles to arm its active and reserve units, there were few replacements. The large number of casualties also meant that an almost equal amount of equipment was lost to the enemy. It was not until April 1915 that Stavka told the corps to organize salvage units that would clean battlefields and trenches of abandon equipment. Many of the tsar's soldiers who had survived the whirlwind bombardments faced the Central Powers' infantry with only a bayonet or a club. Strong rearguards held the Central Powers' soldiers at every river crossing but the enemy's mobile artillery soon rolled up and eliminated the resistance. One Russian general lamented that the Germans used shells to advance while the Russians used men to defend.

- - -
Mackensen's Eleventh Army, supported by the Austro-Hungarian Fourth and Third Army continued their drive across Galicia to retake the fortress at Przemysl. Under the Austrians, the fortress had held out from October 1914 to March 1915. Russian defense lasted a scant few days.

- - -
In early June, the German General Staff changed the direction of the advance. [...]

The German Twelfth Army consisted of seven divisions supported by 860 cannons. It fell on the juncture of the Russian First and Twelfth Armies as Mackensen had done. The bombardment was horrific. The 11 Siberian Division bore the brunt of the attack losing half its strength in 30 minutes. Despite the losses, the first infantry assault was repulsed by survivors who were often without rifles or bullets. Russian artillery with barely 4 rounds per gun available concentrated their fire to support the ill trained and badly equipped soldiers. It was not until nightfall of the first day that the defenders finally gave way and the German drive continued eastward isolating the Vistula River fortresses but not the armies that had been around them.

[...] The general staff had managed to extricate three armies from the German encirclement. The cost was 1.4 million killed or wounded and 976,000 in prisoners of war camps.

Although the Central Powers' drive continued for another month, the fall of the Vistula fortress line along with the loss of the Polish salient by the end of August prompted many critics to call for someone's head. Open letters appeared in newspapers which insinuated that the leadership of Nicholas Nikolovich left much to be desired. Based on this uproar Nicholas II decided that the Grand Duke had to go. On 23 August an ukase announced that the Grand Duke would henceforth command the Russian armies in the Caucasus and the tsar would assume command on the western front. The critics were shocked. They had expected that the tsar would purge the Stavka but not sack its commander. Hurriedly they attempt to try and change the tsar's mind but he refused. Many attribute this steadfastness of the tsar on his wife who was displeased with Nicholas Nikolovich's disparaging remarks toward the tsarina's court favorite monk Rasputin. The conduct of the war had become the sole responsibility of the tsar. The people would blame all future failures on his leadership instead of advisers. This opened the door to the revolution that followed a year and a half later.

---

Fonte:
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/thegreatretreat.aspx

Ainda nos assombra

O GLOBO
4 de janeiro de 2014

Ecos da Primeira Guerra

Como as lições de um século atrás podem construir uma ordem internacional estável.

(Margaret MacMillan)

A Primeira Guerra Mundial ainda nos assombra, em parte pela escala da carnificina - dez milhões de combatentes mortos e muitos mais feridos. Incontáveis civis também perderam suas vidas, seja por meio da ação militar, seja pela fome ou pela doença. Impérios inteiros foram destruídos e sociedades, brutalizadas.

Mas há uma outra razão: até hoje não chegamos a um consenso sobre por que ela aconteceu. Teria sido causada pelas ambições desmedidas de alguns dos homens no poder? O kaiser Wilhelm II e seus ministros, por exemplo, queriam uma Alemanha maior, com um alcance global, capaz de desafiar a supremacia naval britânica. Ou a explicação está nas ideologias conflitantes? Nas rivalidades nacionais? Ou no absoluto e, aparentemente, irreversível, momentum do militarismo? Ou será que o conflito jamais teria acontecido se um evento aleatório em paragens austro-húngaras não tivesse acendido o pavio? Essa é a mais desalentadora de todas as explicações: que a guerra foi simplesmente um erro estúpido que poderia ter sido evitado.

A busca por explicações começou praticamente junto com os primeiros tiros, no verão de 1914, e nunca parou. A proximidade do centenário do início da guerra (em junho deste ano) deve nos fazer refletir mais uma vez sobre a vulnerabilidade humana a erros, catástrofes repentinas e acidentes fatais. A História, numa frase atribuída a Mark Twain, nunca se repete, mas rima. Temos um bom motivo para voltar nosso olhar para trás, mesmo mirando adiante. Se não conseguimos determinar como um dos mais importantes conflitos aconteceu, como poderemos evitar uma catástrofe semelhante no futuro?

PERÍODO MENOS DISTANTE DO QUE PARECE

Embora o período que antecedeu a Primeira Guerra - com sua iluminação a gás e suas carruagens puxadas a cavalos - pareça muito distante, ele é similar ao nosso de muitas maneiras. A globalização - que tendemos a pensar como um fenômeno moderno, criado pela difusão dos negócios e investimentos internacionais, o crescimento da internet e a migração generalizada - também era uma característica daqueles tempos. Mesmo as mais remotas partes do mundo estavam sendo interligadas pelos novos meios de transporte - de estradas de ferro a modernos navios - e pela comunicação, incluindo aí o telefone, o telégrafo e as comunicações sem fio.

As décadas anteriores a 1914 foram, como agora, um período de dramáticas mudanças e conflitos. Novos campos para o comércio e as manufaturas estavam sendo criados, como a rápida expansão da indústria química e elétrica. Einstein desenvolvia a sua teoria geral da relatividade; novas ideias radicais, como a da psicanálise, encontravam seguidores; e as raízes de ideologias predatórias, como o fascismo e o comunismo soviético, ganhavam terreno.

A globalização torna possível a disseminação de ideologias radicais com muito mais rapidez e o agrupamento de fanáticos em busca de uma sociedade perfeita. No período anterior à Primeira Guerra, anarquistas e revolucionários socialistas por toda a Europa e América do Norte liam os mesmos trabalhos e tinham o mesmo objetivo: derrubar a ordem social vigente. Os jovens sérvios que assassinaram o arquiduque Franz Ferdinand, da Áustria, em Sarajevo, foram inspirados por Nietzsche e Bakunin, da mesma forma que seus pares russos e franceses.

De Calcutá a Buffalo, terroristas imitavam uns aos outros nos métodos de jogar bombas nas Bolsas de Valores, explodir linhas de trem e atirar nos que vissem como opressores, fossem eles a imperatriz Elisabeth, do Império Austro-Húngaro, ou o presidente dos EUA, William McKinley. Hoje, as mídias sociais oferecem novos pontos de encontro para fanáticos, permitindo que disseminem suas mensagens para audiências cada vez maiores.

Com a nossa "Guerra ao terror", corremos o mesmo risco de superestimar o poder de uma rede fraca, de poucos extremistas. Mais perigoso ainda podem ser nossos erros de interpretação sobre as mudanças na guerra. Há cem anos, a maior parte dos planejadores militares e dos governos civis entendeu a natureza do conflito que estava por começar de forma catastroficamente errada.

Os grandes avanços em ciência e tecnologia na Europa e a crescente abertura de fábricas durante o período de paz fizeram com que a entrada na guerra fosse muito mais custosa, em termos de baixas, do que se imaginava. Os rifles e armas atiravam com muito mais rapidez e eficácia, a artilharia tinha explosivos muito mais devastadores.

Um erro comparável em nosso tempo é presumir que, por causa de nossa tecnologia avançada, somos capazes de ações militares rápidas, focadas e de grande poder destrutivo - golpes cirúrgicos, com drones e mísseis - resultando em conflitos que seriam curtos e de impacto limitado, e em vitórias decisivas. Cada vez mais, vemos guerras assimétricas, entre forças bem armadas e organizadas de um lado, e insurgentes de outro, que podem se espalhar não apenas por toda uma região, mas por um continente inteiro e até pelo planeta. Ainda assim, não conseguimos ver soluções claras, em parte porque não há só um inimigo, mas coalizões de senhores da guerra locais, guerreiros religiosos e outras partes interessadas.

Pense no Afeganistão ou na Síria, onde agentes locais e internacionais estão misturados, e onde definir exatamente o que constitui uma vitória é algo difícil. Nessas guerras, aqueles que ordenam ações militares devem considerar não apenas os combatentes em solo, mas também a esquiva, mas fundamental, opinião pública. Graças às mídias sociais, cada ataque aéreo, bomba e nuvem de gás venenoso que atinge uma população civil é filmado e tweetado por todo o mundo.

A globalização pode ampliar rivalidades e medos entre países que, de outra forma, poderiam ser amigos. Pouco antes da Primeira Guerra, o Reino Unido, a maior potência naval, e a Alemanha, a maior potência terrestre, eram grandes parceiros comerciais. Mas isso não se traduziu em amizade.

Com a Alemanha dividindo tradicionais mercados britânicos e competindo por colônias, o Reino Unido se sentiu ameaçado. Em 1896, um famoso panfleto britânico, "Feito na Alemanha", já pintava um quadro nefasto: "Um gigante estado comercial está surgindo para ameaçar a nossa prosperidade e disputar conosco o comércio mundial." Quando o kaiser Wilhelm e seu ministro da Marinha, almirante Alfred von Tirpitz, lançaram um submarino militar para desafiar a supremacia naval britânica, o desconforto no Reino Unido se transformou em algo muito próximo do pânico.

GUERRA PODERIA TER SIDO EVITADA

Como os nossos predecessores de um século atrás, presumimos que uma guerra mundial é algo que não fazemos mais. O líder socialista francês Jean Jaurès, um homem que tentou, sem sucesso, barrar a escalada do militarismo nos primeiros anos do século XX, entendeu isso muito bem. "A Europa já passou por tantas crises e por tantos anos", ele disse, logo antes do início da guerra, "já foi perigosamente desafiada tantas vezes sem que guerra alguma acontecesse, que praticamente parou de acreditar nessa ameaça e assiste ao interminável conflito nos Bálcãs com pouca atenção e reduzida preocupação."

Com diferentes líderes, a Primeira Guerra poderia ter sido evitada. A Europa de 1914 precisava de um Bismarck ou de um Churchill, com força o suficiente para suportar a pressão e capacidade de enxergar o quadro estratégico de forma mais ampla. Em vez disso, as potências-chave tinham líderes fracos, distraídos e divididos. Hoje, o presidente dos EUA encara uma série de políticos na China que, como aqueles da Alemanha há um século, querem muito que sua nação seja levada a sério. No caso de Vladimir Putin, Obama lida com um nacionalista russo que é mais astuto e mais forte que o pobre czar Nicolau II.

Obama, como Woodrow Wilson, é um grande orador, capaz de apresentar uma visão de mundo e inspirar os americanos. Mas, como Wilson no final da guerra, lida com um Congresso pouco cooperativo. Talvez ainda mais preocupante seja o fato de que ele pode estar numa posição similar à do primeiro-ministro britânico em 1914, Herbert Asquith - que presidia um país tão dividido que não conseguia exercer uma liderança ativa ou construtiva no mundo.

Às vésperas de 2014, os EUA ainda são a maior potência mundial, mas não são mais tão poderosos quanto já foram. O país sofreu derrotas militares no Iraque e no Afeganistão, e vem encontrando dificuldades de encontrar aliados que o apoiem, como mostra a crise na Síria. Desconfortavelmente cientes de que têm poucos amigos confiáveis e muitos inimigos em potencial, os americanos consideram agora o retorno a uma política isolacionista. Estariam os EUA no limite de seu poder de influência, como o Reino Unido já esteve no passado?

Pode ser necessário um momento de real perigo para forçar as grandes potências a se unirem em coalizões capazes e dispostas a agir. Em vez de ficar pulando de crise em crise, talvez seja a hora de repensar as terríveis lições de um século atrás - na esperança de que nossos líderes, com o nosso apoio, repensem como podem trabalhar juntos para construir uma ordem internacional estável.

---

Fonte:
http://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/historia/ecos-da-primeira-guerra-11207132

Mais:
http://docs.google.com/file/d/1LNvtuGoSU-4jMgvMfuR_zPJ8jk_m-Wes

Isonzo

In many ways the Battles of the Isonzo mirrored those on the Western Front, albeit on a smaller scale. As with the ongoing battle raging in France and Flanders the lines across the Isonzo were defined by the onset of trench warfare.

ITALIAN POLICY OF AGGRESSIVE WARFARE

It was certainly never Italian Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna's intention that the war along the Italian Front should be anything but mobile. For far longer than his contemporaries on the Western Front he persisted in wholly aggressive infantry tactics in determining the strategy for Italian attacks.

Time and again he was determined to break the trench stalemate - and each time circumstances conspired to defeat his objectives.

Whereas Cadorna was desperate to satisfy his Allies (and government) by securing sweeping territorial gains from the Austro-Hungarians, his enemy was perfectly content to maintain a defensive posture. In short, the Austro-Hungarian army (under Eugen and Boroevic) prepared solely for a defensive war - and possession of the mountains along the Isonzo greatly assisted them in their resolve.

TRENCH WARFARE ALONG THE ISONZO

But how did trench warfare along the Isonzo come to pass? While hostilities along the Italian Front began officially in late May 1915 with Italy's formal entry into the war on the side of the Allies, preparations for battle had gone on for rather longer.

Cadorna intended to spring surprise attacks across the Isonzo as soon as war began; and his Austro-Hungarian foe, suspecting something of the kind, fortified the mountain passes against likely attack. In the preparation of trenches and defensive lines the Austro-Hungarians had a year's head start, having been in a state of war since late-July 1914.

COUNTDOWN TO THE BATTLES OF THE ISONZO

As soon as war was announced Cadorna initiated his surprise offensive, called "the First Jump" (Primo Sbalzo). Launched in distinct areas at points along the Italian Front (and not just along the Isonzo river) the series of attacks were designed to boost the Italian army's position from the first.

Thus, in the north-east the Italians advanced across the Italian-Austrian border to the banks of the Isonzo. Italian General Frugoni rapidly captured Caporetto - later the scene of a spectacular combined German-Austro-Hungarian assault.

Somewhat further south Duke Aosta attempted to advance on Gorizia but was repulsed by prepared Austro-Hungarian forces massed around the city and surrounding mountains.

In the south itself the Italians were unable to make much progress on account of seasonal flooding around Monfalcone (which ought to have been foreseen by Cadorna). Similarly, Italian attacks upon the Tolmino bridgehead, at Mte Krn, failed owing to a lack of planning and sufficient artillery support.

Notwithstanding this Cadorna ordered a concerted attempt to create an Italian bridgehead between Gorizia and Tolmino in an unsuccessful attack which ran from 11-17 June 1915. This was to be the final attack ahead of the First Battle of the Isonzo which began less than a week later on 23 June, the first of four Italian Isonzo assaults throughout the remainder of 1915.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE ISONZO: 23 JUNE-7 JULY 1915

In numerical terms the Italians enjoyed a marked advantage over their Austro-Hungarian opponents. General Boroevic was able to muster a force of around 100,000 for the Austro-Hungarians while Frugoni and the Duke of Aosta for the Italians had twice that number at their disposal, added to which they possessed around 200 guns.

Despite their seemingly decisive superiority in numbers the Italians - after a one week artillery bombardment of Austrian positions - battered against the Austro-Hungarian lines in vain in their attempt to cross the river and scale the mountains beyond.

Cadorna was duplicating the early mistakes of commanders on the Western Front. He chose to launch massed infantry assaults without first assembling sufficient artillery protection. Further, he had diluted the potency of his attack by launching tactically unnecessary subsidiary attacks in the Trentino and in the central Isonzo near Gorizia.

Two additional divisions of Austro-Hungarian infantry were rapidly despatched to Boroevic's aid and the Austrian commander successfully prevented any Italian crossing of the Isonzo before Cadorna called off his attack after two weeks on 7 July.

The Italians had however made a number of minor gains: Mount Krn was partly occupied and the heights around Plezzo were taken, as was Mount Colowrat (opposite Tolmino).

The pause was brief however; the Second Battle of the Isonzo was launched just eleven days later, on 18 July 1915.

---

Fonte:
http://firstworldwar.com/battles/isonzo1.htm

Mais:
http://www.worldwar1.com/itafront/ison1915.htm

The loom of youth

Trechos de The Loom Of Youth (1917), de Alec Waugh.

---

Hardly a week later a great nation forgot its greatness, and Europe trembled on the brink of war. During those days of awful suspense, when it was uncertain whether England would enter into the contest or not, Gordon could hardly keep still with nervous excitement.

- - -
It was an expensive day. They rushed from one thing to another. The strain was intolerable. After supper they went to the West End Cinema, and there, just before closing-time, a film, in which everyone was falling into a dirty duck-pond for no ostensible reason, was suddenly stopped, and there appeared across the screen the flaming notice:

ENGLAND HAS DECLARED WAR ON GERMANY

GOD SAVE THE KING!

There was dead silence for a moment. Then cheer upon cheer convulsed the house. The band struck up the National Anthem. The sequel to the tragedy of the duck-pond was never known.

"Glorious! Glorious!" said Ferrers, as they staggered out into the cool night air. "A war is what we want. It will wake us up from sleeping; stir us into life; inflame our literature. There's a real chance now of sweeping away the old outworn traditions. In a great fire they will all be burnt. Then we can build afresh. I wish I could go and fight. Damn my heart! To think of all the running it stood at Oxford; and then suddenly to give way. My doctor always tells me to be careful. If I could go, by God, I would have my shot at the bloody Germans; but still I'll do something at Fernhurst. Stoics, you know; Army class English. How old are you? Sixteen! We shall have you for two years yet. This war is going to save England and everything! Glorious!"

The flaring lights of Leicester Square, the tawdry brilliance of Piccadilly seemed to burst into one volcano of red splendour; a thousand cannons spitting flame; a thousand eyes bright with love of England. The swaying Tube swept Gordon home in a state of subconscious delirium to the starlit calm of Hampstead.

Throughout the long summer holidays this feeling of rejoicing sustained Gordon's heart. He saw an age rising out of these purging fires that would rival the Elizabethan. He saw a second Marlowe and a second Webster. His soul was aflame with hope. He had no doubt as to the result. Even the long retreat from Mons, with its bitter list of casualties, failed to terrorise him. Half the holidays he spent in Wychtown, a little Somersetshire village, and his enthusiasm at one time took the form of buying bundles of newspapers, which he distributed at the cottages, so as to keep everyone in touch with the state of affairs. At one time he thought of going round discussing the war with some of the villagers; but he soon abandoned this project. He began with an aged man who had fought at Majuba.

"Well, Mr Cavendish, and what do you think of the war this morning."

"Lor' bless you, things beant what they were in my young days. At Majuba, now, we did things a bit different-like. But these 'ere Germans, now, they be getting on right well. Be they for us?"

After this Gordon decided that the natural simplicity of the yokel was proof against anything he might have to say. He pitied electioneering agents.

- - -
October went by with its red-gold leaves and amber sunlight. November swept in bringing a procession of long evenings and flickering lights. The first boom of the war fever died down.

- - -
"You know," he was saying, "I do get so sick of these masters who go about with the theory of 'God's in his heaven, all's right with the world,' and in war-time, too! With all these men falling, and no advance being made from day to day."

- - -
"Yes, I suppose you have seen a good many ideals go tumbling down. All our generation has been sacrificed; of course it is inevitable. But it is rather hard. The older men have seen some of their hopes realised; we shall see none. I don't know when this war will end; not just yet, I think. But whenever it does, just as far as we are concerned the days of roses will be over. For the time being art and literature are dead. Look at the rotten stuff that's being written to-day. At the beginning we were deceived by the tinsel of war; Romance dies hard. But we know now. We've done with fairy tales. There is nothing glorious in war, no good can come of it. It's bloody, utterly bloody. I know it's inevitable, but that's no excuse. So are rape, theft, murder. It's a bloody business. Oh, Caruthers, my boy, the world will be jolly Philistine the next few years. Commercialism will be made a god."

"Do you mean there is going to be nothing for us after the war?" said Gordon.

"Not for you or me; for the masses, perhaps. No one can go through this without having his senses dulled, his individuality knocked out of him. It will take at least twenty years to recover what we have lost, and there won't be much fire left in you and me by then. Oh, I can tell you I am frightened of what's coming after. I can't face it. Of course there may be a great revival some day. Do you remember what Rupert Brooke said in Second Best about there waiting for the 'great unborn some white tremendous daybreak'? That's what may happen. But our generation will have been sacrificed for it. I suppose we should not grumble."

- - -
Early on the Sunday morning he went back to his regiment. Gordon walked down to the station with him.

"I am going to the front in about a week, you know," said Tester, as they were standing on the platform.

"Good Lord! man, why didn't you tell us before?"

"Oh, I don't know. I didn't want them all unburdening themselves to me... Here's the train. Well, good-bye, Caruthers. Good luck."

"Thanks awfully; and mind you come back all right."

Tester smiled at him rather sadly.

"I am not coming back," he said.

- - -
Gordon had almost ceased to expect anything. Day followed day. Everyone was discontented; even Ferrers began to doubt whether the war was having such a good effect on the Public Schools after all. He said as much in an article in The Country. He was always saying things in The Country. It was his clearing ground.

---

Mais:
http://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxwrrqPyqsnIVW5sX2tFSldpZm8
Evelyn Waugh (1)
Evelyn Waugh (2)

Consuming the future

Trechos de A World Undone: The Story Of The Great War (2006), de G.J. Meyer.

---

Consuming the future

A rather elemental question: where did the money come from? How did Germany and Austria-Hungary and Turkey and Bulgaria on one hand, Britain and France and Russia and Italy on the other, pay for such an immense and protracted struggle?

The answer, in a nutshell, is that they didn't. None of them even tried. In addition to being the greatest bloodbath in the history of western Europe and the greatest in eastern Europe until the Second World War, the Great War was a process by which all the great powers, victors and vanquished alike, transformed themselves from bastions of prosperity into sinkholes of poverty and debt. Financially as in so many other ways, the war was a road to ruin.

This development was not unforeseen. As technological progress accelerated in the nineteenth century and fueled tremendous military expansion, the question of how much a general war would cost became one of the great imponderables facing the governments of Europe. In 1898 a Russian named Ivan Bloch produced a six-volume study, Future War, in which he postulated that armed conflict between the great powers would mean "not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organization." He predicted that any such war would be short because financially insupportable. Twelve years later a book titled The Great Illusion, by the Englishman Norman Angell, became an international best-seller by predicting that not even the winners could possibly benefit from a major war. Military power, Angell said, had become "socially and economically futile, and can have no relationship to the prosperity of the people exercising it." Such a warning seemed credible: when Angell's book appeared, all the great powers were spending scores and even hundreds of millions of dollars annually on their armies and navies. Such spending continued to increase through the last four years of peace, and much of the increase was made possible by borrowing. Only Britain, wealthiest of the European powers and the one with the smallest army, was balancing its budget.

What was not foreseen was the ability of the industrialized nations to go on fighting year after year even while devouring themselves financially. As astute an economist as John Maynard Keynes was a year into the Great War before he understood that total war would not cause total financial collapse. "As long as there are goods and labor in the country the government can buy them with banknotes," he wrote in September 1915, "and if the people try to spend the notes, an increase in their real consumption is immediately checked by a corresponding rise of prices." The truth, he concluded, was that bankruptcy would never force the great powers to stop fighting. They could be stopped only by the exhaustion of their manpower, their physical resources, or their will to continue. The next few years showed him to be entirely right.

With the start of the war, every one of the nations involved cast aside any semblance of financial restraint. As early as October 1914 Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George was admonishing the British war office not to come to him for approval before ordering whatever it thought it needed. It was the same in every capital: governments worried not about how much they were spending but about whether their military leaders were doing everything possible (which often meant buying everything possible) to outmatch the enemy. Budgets ceased to matter.

Great nations found themselves unable not only to pay their bills but even, in some cases, to pay the interest on what they were borrowing. By 1917 the German government's expenditures amounted to 76 percent of net national product; they had been 18 percent just before the war. Tax revenues were covering only 8 percent of the spending. That same year Britain's military spending was 70 percent of national output, and revenues were about a fourth of expenses. France's military budget, thanks to heavy borrowing, was equal to or even more than total output.

The strategies adopted by the various countries for maintaining sources of credit varied greatly and were almost indescribably complicated. The problems were greatest for the least developed nations, Russia and Austria-Hungary in particular. The solution in both cases was reliance on stronger senior partners. Russia began borrowing from its allies as early as October 1914. Eventually it borrowed £568 million from London and three and a half billion francs from Paris - colossal sums for the time, equivalent to billions of dollars. Germany found it necessary to be similarly generous to Austria-Hungary, and later to Turkey and Bulgaria as well. The Russians had compounded their difficulties by shutting down the state monopoly on alcohol early in the war as a gesture of austerity, patriotism, and willingness to sacrifice. This accomplished nothing except cutting off a fourth of Petrograd's revenues, creating a huge black market in vodka, and worsening inflation.

Not one country attempted to meet its expenses or even reduce its deficits through increased taxes. Where taxes were increased, the purpose was either to inhibit inflation by soaking up some of the wages flowing to workers or to maintain a flow of revenue sufficient to satisfy the credit markets. New taxes were sometimes imposed on profiteers, but more to maintain public morale (damaged everywhere by the spectacle of tycoons reaping fortunes while everyone else suffered) than to increase revenue. Tax systems became less rather than more progressive. Governments tried to limit the amounts of money available to working people for the pursuit of increasingly scarce goods while simultaneously helping the wealthy to retain their assets for investment in postwar rebuilding.

The situation first became serious for the Central Powers, which virtually from the first day of the war had lost their merchant fleets and access both to their own overseas investments and to global sources of credit. They had to do nearly all their borrowing internally, through loans from domestic financial institutions and the sale of bonds. They were surprisingly successful. Germany issued war bonds twice annually. The many marks raised in this way covered two-thirds of its war costs.

The British and French were far more able than the Germans to repatriate money they had invested overseas, and because of the naval blockade only the Entente was able to buy and borrow from the United States. But gradually, inexorably, their treasuries were depleted. Questions arose in New York and Washington about their ability to make good on their debt. In November 1916 the U.S. Federal Reserve Board warned its member banks against continuing to buy foreign - which meant British and French - treasury bills. The result was a near-panic in which London retaliated by briefly ceasing to place orders in the United States and urged France to do likewise. By April 1917 the British were spending $75 million a week in the United States, were overdrawn on their American accounts by $358 million, and had only $490 million in securities and $87 million in gold to draw on to make good their debt. In short, they were only weeks away from insolvency.

But this was a crisis for the United States too. American manufacturers and farmers had become dependent on sales to the Entente, and American banks were owed immense amounts. A British and French financial collapse - never mind the outright defeat of the two nations - would have been a disaster for the U.S. economy. Thus the German submarines were not Washington's only reason for wanting to save the Entente. In purely practical business terms, it became dangerous for the United States not to enter the war.

It is estimated that the war ultimately cost $208 billion - this at a time when skilled workers were paid a few dollars a day. The final bill was $43.8 billion for Britain, $28.2 billion for France, and $47 billion for Germany. In each case, the result was the same. The wealth of all the belligerent countries was drastically reduced.

The ultimate result is expressed in the word disinvestment. All the European powers stopped making the kinds of investments required for real economic growth. Everything, even the future, went into the flaming cauldron of the war. Britain, that paragon of affluence and commercial success in 1914, ended the war sunk in debt, its civil infrastructure a shambles. The Europeans had begun the war at the pinnacle of the world's economic and financial hierarchy, and they ended it as wrecks. Ivan Bloch had been wrong about the feasibility of keeping such a war going. About the consequences, however, he had turned out to be dead right.

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Mais:
http://www.econtrader.com/economics/explain/how-gold-standard-works.htm
http://docs.google.com/file/d/1Q59hMJFPzMsUOtKaV_3rpUNo26GYAO36

Anzacs

WAR IS ANNOUNCED

The coming of war, declared on 4 August 1914, caught most Australians by surprise even though there had been a climate for war for many years. An expectation had arisen of a clash between Europe’s two major trading nations, Britain and Germany.

Australia was in the middle of an election campaign when war came. Both leaders, Joseph Cook, Prime Minister, and Andrew Fisher, leader of the Labor Party, promised Australian support to Britain.

Labor won the Federal Election and became an enthusiastic 'win-the-war' party in government. Supporting the initial pledge of 20,000 men, the new Government watched an extraordinary rush to enlist all around the country and soon promised an increase in the expeditionary force to take the total to 50,000 men.

FIRST RECRUITS

The recruits were wildly popular in their various marches and parades in each of the capital cities and as the first troopships departed Australian shores in late October 1914 there were large crowds on hand to say farewell.

Instead of going to Britain, which everyone had expected, the troops were diverted to Egypt, largely because it was feared the Australians would not withstand the terrible English winter in makeshift camps on Salisbury Plain. It was tough in Egypt too, with basic facilities, and not much in the way of training beyond marching up and down the sand dunes and deserts.

Although some Australians misbehaved and were sent home, the vast majority accepted that a soldier's life can be pretty tough. There were rumours throughout the camp about where they would fight and in April it was confirmed that the Australians, alongside their New Zealand comrades, would attempt an invasion of Turkey to open the Black Sea to the Allies as a supply route for beleaguered Russia.

LANDING AT ANZAC

Sending troops to land from the sea on hostile territory against a well-prepared enemy has rarely been attempted in all the annals of military history. That the Anzacs (as they soon began to be called) gained a toehold at all on the Gallipoli Peninsula was considered remarkable and that they repelled all Turkish attempts to drive them back into the sea was an indication of their bravery and determination.

The Landing at Gallipoli captured the imagination of the Australian public as no other event in Australian history has ever done. The news provoked a rush of Australian recruits to the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and eventually 320,000 Australians would serve overseas in the war - an extraordinary contribution from a nation of just over four million people.

Enthusiasm for the war continued even though the Anzacs were evacuated from Gallipoli in December 1915, leaving more than 8,000 Australians in lonely graves dotted around Gallipoli.

THE WESTERN FRONT

After re-training and refreshment in Egypt, and with the expansion of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) to accommodate the huge number of new recruits, the Australians set off for France and the Western Front. Arriving in late May they received an enthusiastic reception from the French people, who were amazed men would travel from the ends of the earth to help France in its greatest crisis.

1916 and 1917 were years of unrelenting and horrible fighting for the Australians and they suffered huge losses which dwarfed the casualties experienced at Gallipoli. At Fromelles on 19-20 July 1916, the Australians suffered 5,500 casualties overnight on what was described as the worst day ever in Australian history. In seven weeks fighting at Pozieres and Mouquet Farm from 23 July 1916 onwards, the Australians suffered 21,000 casualties. In 1917 the deaths continued at places such as Bullecourt and Passchendaele in Belgium.

CONSCRIPTION

The numbers of recruits dwindled in Australia from early 1917 onwards, possibly because there were few men with the capacity to enlist. The work of the nation, in its factories, offices, schools and shops, and on its farms, had to be continued somehow. Yet war patriots began to think that every man in the right age group should be at the war. They demanded that the government introduce conscription. Two referenda were held in Australia in October 1916 and December 1917 to see if the people would support conscription as a method of reinforcing the AIF. The campaigns caused enormous division in the community and both were lost by very narrow margins.

VICTORY

By 1918 the AIF was at the height of its fighting powers: experienced, grimly determined, and well led by its own Australian commanders, at last, to the great satisfaction of all Australian soldiers. (Victorian John Monash became commander of the Australian Corps in June 1918). Though savagely reduced in numbers, the AIF battalions won some remarkable victories in 1918, at Villers-Bretonneux, in the Battle of Amiens, at Hamel, Mont St Quentin and Peronne. Exhausted, the Australians were withdrawn from the line in October, after months of continuous fighting, and the war ended on 11 November 1918 when the Germans submitted to the signing of an Armistice.

The war had cost Australians dearly. It had damaged political and social harmony at home because of the bitterness of the conscription campaigns, and introduced deep religious and social divisions. 60,000 Australians had been killed in the war, many of them because of the might of the artillery, lay buried, in unknown graves. As many as 150,000 men returned home badly wounded in mind or body.

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Fonte:
http://anzaccentenary.vic.gov.au/history/australias-contribution-wwi

Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5HEKJ4a2z0I

Audacia

IL POPOLO D'ITALIA
15 novembre 1914

Audacia

(Benito Mussolini)

In un'epoca di liquidazione generale come la presente, non solo i morti vanno in fretta come pretendeva il poeta, ma i vivi vanno ancor più in fretta dei morti. Attendere, può significare giungere in ritardo e trovarsi dinnanzi all'inesorabile fatto compiuto, che lamentazioni inutili non valgono a cancellare. Se si fosse trattato e si trattasse di una questione di secondaria importanza, non avrei sentito il bisogno, meglio, il "dovere", di creare un giornale: ma, ora, checché si dica dai neutralisti del socialismo conservatore, una questione formidabile sta per essere risolta: i destini del socialismo europeo sono in relazione strettissima coi possibili risultati di questa guerra; disinteressarsene significa staccarsi dalla storia e dalla vita, lavorare per la reazione e non per la Rivoluzione Sociale. Ah no! I socialisti rivoluzionari italiani - sian essi guidati dal raziocinio o sospinti da oscure, ma infallibili intuizioni sentimentali sanno qual è il grido che conviene lanciare al proletariato italiano. La neutralità non può essere un dogma del socialismo. Esisterebbero dunque solo nel socialismo e per giunta, nel socialismo italiano, delle verità "assolute" che possono sfidare impunemente le ingiurie del tempo e le limitazioni dello spazio, come le verità indiscutibili e eterne della rivelazione divina? Ma la verità assoluta attorno alla quale non si può più discutere, che non si può più negare o rinnegare, è la verità morta; peggio, è la verità che uccide. Noi non siamo, noi non vogliamo esser mummie perennemente immobili con la faccia rivolta allo stesso orizzonte, o rinchiuderci tra le siepi anguste della beghinità sovversiva, dove si biascicano meccanicamente le formule corrispondenti alle preci delle religioni professate; ma siamo uomini e uomini vivi che vogliamo dare il nostro contributo, sia pure modesto, alla creazione della storia. Incoerenza? Apostasia? Diserzione? Mai più. Resta a vedersi da quale parte stiano gli incoerenti, gli apostati, i disertori. Lo dirà la storia domani, ma la previsione rientra nell'ambito delle nostre possibilità divinatorie. Se domani ci sarà un po' più di libertà in Europa, un ambiente, quindi, politicamente più adatto allo sviluppo del socialismo, alla formazione delle capacità di classe del proletariato, disertori ed apostati saranno stati tutti coloro che al momento in cui si trattava di agire, si sono neghittosamente tratti in disparte: se domani - invece - la reazione prussiana trionferà sull'Europa e - dopo alla distruzione del Belgio, - col progettato annientamento della Francia - abbasserà il livello della civiltà umana, disertori ed apostati saranno stati tutti coloro che nulla hanno tentato per impedire la catastrofe.

Da questo ferreo dilemma non si esce, ricorrendo alle sottili elucubrazioni degli avvocati d'ufficio della neutralità assoluta o ripetendo un grido di "abbasso" che prima della guerra poteva avere un contenuto e un significato, ma oggi non lo ha più.

Oggi - io lo grido forte - la propaganda antiguerresca è la propaganda della vigliaccheria. Ha fortuna perché vellica ed esaspera l'istinto della conservazione individuale. Ma per ciò stesso è una propaganda anti-rivoluzionaria. La facciano i preti temporalisti e i gesuiti che hanno un interesse materiale e spirituale alla conservazione dell'impero austriaco; la facciano i borghesi, contrabbandieri o meno, che - specie in Italia dimostrano la loro pietosa insufficienza politica e morale; la facciano i monarchici che, specie se insigniti del laticlavio, non sanno rassegnarsi a stracciare il trattato della Triplice che garantiva - oltre alla pace (nel modo che abbiamo visto) - l'esistenza dei troni; codesta coalizione di pacifisti sa bene quello che vuole e noi ci spieghiamo ormai facilmente i motivi che inspirano il suo atteggiamento. Ma noi, socialisti, abbiamo rappresentato - salvo nelle epoche basse del riformismo mercatore e giolittiano - una delle forze "vive" della nuova Italia: vogliamo ora legare il nostro destino a queste forze "morte" in nome di una "pace" che non ci salva oggi dai disastri della guerra e non ci salverà domani da pericoli infinitamente maggiori e in ogni caso non ci salverà dalla vergogna e dallo scherno universale dei popoli che hanno vissuto questa grande tragedia della storia? Vogliamo trascinare la nostra miserabile esistenza alla giornata - beati nello statu quo monarchico e borghese - o vogliamo invece spezzare questa compagine sorda e torbida di intrighi e di viltà? Non potrebbe essere questa la nostra ora? Invece di prepararci a "subire" gli avvenimenti preordinando un alibi scandaloso, non è meglio tentare di dominarli? Il compito di socialisti rivoluzionari non potrebbe essere quello di svegliare le coscienze addormentate delle moltitudini e di gettare palate di calce viva nella faccia ai morti - e son tanti in Italia! - che si ostinano nell'illusione di vivere? Gridare: noi vogliamo la guerra! non potrebbe essere - allo stato dei fatti - molto più rivoluzionario che gridare "abbasso"? Questi interrogativi inquietanti, ai quali, per mio conto, ho risposto, spiegano l'origine e gli scopi del giornale. Questo ch'io compio è un atto d'audacia e non mi nascondo le difficoltà dell'impresa. Sono molte e complesse, ma ho la ferma fiducia di superarle. Non sono solo. Non tutti i miei amici di ieri mi seguiranno; ma molti altri spiriti ribelli si raccoglieranno attorno a me. Farò un giornale indipendente, liberissimo, personale, mio. Ne risponderò solo alla mia coscienza e a nessun altro. Non ho intenzioni aggressive contro il Partito Socialista, o contro gli organi del Partito nel quale intendo di restare, ma sono disposto a battermi contro chiunque tentasse di impedirmi la libera critica di un atteggiamento che ritengo per varie ragioni esiziale agli interessi nazionali e internazionali del Proletariato.

Dei malvagi e degli idioti non mi curo. Restino nel loro fango i primi, crepino nella loro nullità intellettuale gli ultimi. lo cammino! E riprendendo la marcia - dopo la sosta che fu breve - è a voi, giovani d'Italia; giovani delle officine e degli atenei; giovani d'anni e giovani di spirito; giovani che appartenete alla generazione cui il destino ha commesso di "fare" la storia; è a voi che io lancio il mio grido augurale, sicuro che avrà nelle vostre file una vasta risonanza di echi e di simpatie.

Il grido è una parola che io non avrei mai pronunciato in tempi normali, e che innalzo invece forte, a voce spiegata, senza infingimenti, con sicura fede, oggi: una parola paurosa e fascinatrice: guerra!

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Fonte:
http://ilpopoloditalia.blogspot.com.br/p/parola-di-mussolini-gli-articoli.html

Mais:
http://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxwrrqPyqsnISmlMOTBjOWYwTXM
http://docs.google.com/file/d/11sy6H00WdwnQXxSjIc0cQzErflFAVteK