Trechos de My War Memories: 1914-1918 (1919), de Erich Ludendorff.
To the heroes who fell
Believing In Germany's Greatness
This book is dedicated
Believing In Germany's Greatness
This book is dedicated
During the four years of fighting I was unable to keep any record of events. I had not the time. Now that I have more leisure, I propose to repair this omission by writing my experiences during the Great War, drawing chiefly upon my memory for the narrative.
It has been my destiny to hold various high appointments. Upon Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and myself, in conjunction with other men, devolved the task of conducting the defence of the Fatherland.
In these pages I propose to give an account of those deeds of the German people and their Army with which my name will for all time be associated. I shall tell of my strivings and of all that I lived through in this struggle of the nations - how the German people fought as men have never fought before, how they endured, and how their efforts were gradually paralysed.
Germany has not yet had time for introspection and heart-searching. She is too heavily weighed down. And yet she can take heart from the magnificent deeds of her Army, and from all they, too, accomplished who worked at home. But if she wishes to learn anything from the succession of events which culminated in her undoing, she has no time to lose, for the world's history strides ruthlessly on, and tramples under foot those nations who tear themselves to pieces by internal conflict.
(Written at Hessleholmsgard, in Sweden, between November, 1918, and February, 1919; completed in Berlin by the 23rd of June, the day on which we accepted (!) the Peace.)
- - -
The coup de main at Liège was the first of the series of German victories. The decision was a bold one, and its execution extremely daring.
The campaigns of 1914, 1915 and the summer of 1916 in the East were tremendous achievements, equal to the greatest military feats of any age. They made the highest demands on both commanders and troops. The Russians were then greatly superior in numbers to the allied German and Austro-Hungarian armies opposed to them.
But, indeed, the operations which Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and I had to conduct from the 29th August, 1916, the day we assumed supreme command, rank among the most formidable in history. Nothing more awe-inspiring and destructive has ever been seen on earth. Germany, inferior in numbers and with weak allies, was contending against the world. Decisions of the utmost gravity had to be taken. They were the inevitable and logical result of the situation, our general conception of war, and the particular circumstances of this war.
The armies and fleets fought as they had fought in days past, even though numbers and equipment were mightier than ever before. What made this war different from all others was the manner in which the home populations supported and reinforced their armed forces with all the resources at their disposal. Only in France, in 1870-71, had anything of the kind been seen before.
In this war it was impossible to distinguish where the sphere of the Army and Navy began and that of the people ended. Army and people were one. The world witnessed the War of Nations in the most literal sense of the word. In this mighty concentration of effort the Great Powers of the earth faced each other. And not only between the armed forces did the combat rage along those huge fronts and on distant oceans. The moral and vital force of the civil population was assailed with the purpose of corroding and paralysing them.
With big battalions it is neither difficult nor very risky to wage war and fight battles. But in the first three years of the war the Field-Marshal and I never found ourselves in that enviable position. We could but act as duty and conscience dictated, and adopt the measures we deemed necessary to secure victory. During this period success crowned our efforts.
When, in March, 1918, we attacked with the balance of numbers more in our favour than had previously been the case, our strength sufficed to win great victories, but not to bring about a rapid decision. Then it dwindled, while the enemy grew stronger.
- - -
This world-wide war of nations made enormous demands on us Germans, on whom its whole overwhelming burden fell. Every individual had to give his very utmost, if we were to win. We had literally to fight and work to the last drop of blood and sweat, and yet maintain our fighting spirit and, above all, our confidence in victory: a hard but imperative necessity, in spite of the dearth of food which the enemy imposed on us, and the onslaught of his propaganda, which was of amazing force, if unobtrusive.
Our Army and Navy are rooted in the Nation, as is the oak in German soil. They live upon the homeland, and from it they draw their strength. They can keep, but cannot produce what they need, and can only fight with the moral, material and physical means which the country provides. These means make possible victory, faithful devotion and unselfish self-sacrifice in the daily battle and the miseries of war. They alone could secure Germany's final success. With them our country waged the titanic conflict against the world, even allowing for the assistance of our Allies and the exploitation of occupied territories as far as the laws of land warfare permitted.
The Army and Navy had thus to look to the homeland for their constant renewal and rejuvenation in moral, numbers and equipment.
It was essential to maintain the moral and war spirit of those at home at the highest pitch. Woe to us if they should fail! The longer the war lasted, the greater grew the danger of this, the harder it became to overcome difficulties, and the more imperious were the demands of the Army and Navy for spiritual and moral reinforcement.
The very last resources, both in men and material, had to be made available and devoted to the prosecution of the war.
These were enormous tasks for the country. The homeland was not only the basis on which our proud military power rested, and which must therefore be carefully safeguarded; it was the life-giving source which had to be kept clear, pure and yet potent, lest it lose anything of that virtue wherewith it steeled the nerves and renewed the strength of the Army and Navy. The nation needed those inner spiritual forces which alone enabled it to go on revitalizing the Army and Navy. The spheres of the nation and of the armed forces were so intermingled that it was impossible to separate them. The fighting efficiency of the forces in face of the enemy depended absolutely upon that of the people at home. That meant that everyone at home must work and live for the war in a way that had never been known before. It was for the Government, and the Imperial Chancellor, who was specially responsible, to direct and foster that spirit.
Upon this Minister devolved another important war function: the direction of operations against the enemy's home fronts. Should Germany neglect to use this powerful weapon, the effects of which she daily experienced in her own body? Should we not attack the moral of our enemies in the same way as they were, unfortunately so successfully, attacking ours? This contest had first to be transferred to neutral countries, and thence from front to front. But Germany always lacked one mighty means of propaganda: starvation of the enemy peoples by blockade.
The Government had great problems to solve if the war was to be brought to a successful conclusion. No greater demand has ever been made on a German government than to place the united strength of the German people at the disposal of the Emperor in order to secure victory in the field, and carry on the war against the spirit and moral of the enemy nations. Thus the action and conduct of the Government attained decisive importance. This meant that Government, Reichstag and People must devote themselves utterly to the idea of war that was the only way: the power to wage war had its source at home and was put to the proof at the front.
The great aim of peace could only be attained by relentless prosecution of the war. By working for the war, therefore, the Government at the same time paved the way for peace, to attain which at the first possible moment was their glorious, ultimate goal.
Soon after we were summoned to assume the supreme command, and had time to consider the situation in all its bearings, the Field-Marshal and I laid our views as to the requirements of the Army and Navy before the Imperial Chancellor, and discussed the problems which they raised for the country. We called upon him to co-operate in prosecuting the war, and were buoyed up with hope in spite of the menacing aspect of the situation.
The Government had welcomed our appointment to the supreme command. We met them with frank confidence. Soon, however, two schools of thought, represented by their views and ours, began to come into conflict. This divergence of view was a great disappointment to us and vastly increased our burden.
In Berlin they were unable to accept our opinion as to the necessity of certain war measures, or to steel their wills to the point of magnetizing the whole nation and directing its life and thought to the single idea of war and victory. The great democracies of the Entente did better. With an iron will Gambetta in 1870-71, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George in this war, enrolled their peoples in the service of victory. Our Government failed to recognize this inflexible purpose and the definite intention of the Entente to destroy us. They should never have doubted it. Instead of concentrating all our resources and using them to the utmost in order to achieve peace on the battlefield, as the very nature of war demands, the authorities in Berlin followed a different path: they talked more and more about reconciliation and understanding, without giving our own people a strong warlike impetus at the same time. In Berlin they believed, or deceived themselves into believing, that the hostile nations were longing to hear words of reconciliation and would urge their governments towards peace. So little did they understand the mind of our enemies, both, people and governments, their strong national feeling and unbending will. Berlin had learned nothing from history. They only felt their own impotence in face of the enemy's spirit; they lost the hope of victory and drifted. The desire for peace became stronger than the will to fight for victory. The road to peace was blocked by the will of the enemy, whose aim was our destruction; in seeking it the Government neglected to lead the nation by the hard road to victory.
Reichstag and People found themselves without that strong lead which, generally speaking, they longed for, and slid with the Government down the slippery way. The tremendous questions arising out of the war were more and more thrust on one side, for people's minds were occupied with questions of internal politics and thoughts of self. That meant the ruin of our country, It may be that the revolution which is now shattering Europe may usher in a new world order and make the thoughts and feelings of the nations more ready for a peace of justice and reconciliation. The armistice and peace conditions certainly point the other way. In any case, all the time I was First Quartermaster-General the world had not yet changed.
Our General Staff took the same view as President Wilson, who supported his demand for a great American naval programme on the grounds that it would be absurd for America to adjust her naval programme to a future world policy, when the latter had not yet been decided.
- - -
The astonished world, its ideals shattered, now perceives this clearly. The German people has been misled, and is now paying for its delusion with its life.
- - -
Directly after war broke out, General Headquarters was obliged to take action in connection with several matters which were really the sphere of other authorities. The Press, the censorship, precautions against spies and sabotage at home, dealing with revolutionaries, all these wide fields were left to the unaided efforts of the military authorities, to the detriment of the conduct of the war.
- - -
It became more and more the fashion to hold the General Staff, which in this case meant myself, responsible for our troubles and miseries. For example, my name was associated not only with the unavoidable hardships, but even with some of the abominations of the home rationing system.
- - -
In the winter of 1916-17 I was blamed for the shortage of transport and coal. This was mainly due to insufficient provision having been made before I was appointed to General Headquarters. In February, 1917, I urged the appointment of a Coal Controller. Unfortunately the right man was not discovered at once, and another had to be selected later on. In the summer of 1917 50,000 miners were released by General Headquarters from service at the front. In the winter of 1917-18 house-fuel was more plentiful than in the previous one; but General Headquarters, which had taken decisive measures and was certainly more responsible for the improved situation than for the bad conditions of 1916-17, got neither thanks nor credit.
- - -
Unless we got a peace which safeguarded the existence of our country, the war would be lost. I could not see how peace was possible unless the enemy also was ready for it. I thought it very dangerous for us to be alone in announcing a desire for peace.
- - -
The enemy was not yet broken. When this had been effected by military victory the diplomats might talk about reconciliation - if they still wanted to.
- - -
Mine has been a life of work for our country, the Emperor and the Army. During the four years of war I lived only for the war.
- - -
Deeply moved by the events of the 8th August, 1918, I placed my post at the disposal of the Field-Marshal. There is no question that the terrible disappointments towards the end of the war had worn me out, but my nerves never gave way under the strain.
Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLrWPsj6fVbeVD5xo_h2O6m1JtXS1Grs5D
* Neste dossiê do jornal O Estado de São Paulo, na parte '1914: Quando horror se alastrou', as legendas das fotos de Ludendorff e Hindenburg estão trocadas. Em 2014 enviei um email avisando sobre o erro. Nunca me responderam.
It has been my destiny to hold various high appointments. Upon Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and myself, in conjunction with other men, devolved the task of conducting the defence of the Fatherland.
In these pages I propose to give an account of those deeds of the German people and their Army with which my name will for all time be associated. I shall tell of my strivings and of all that I lived through in this struggle of the nations - how the German people fought as men have never fought before, how they endured, and how their efforts were gradually paralysed.
Germany has not yet had time for introspection and heart-searching. She is too heavily weighed down. And yet she can take heart from the magnificent deeds of her Army, and from all they, too, accomplished who worked at home. But if she wishes to learn anything from the succession of events which culminated in her undoing, she has no time to lose, for the world's history strides ruthlessly on, and tramples under foot those nations who tear themselves to pieces by internal conflict.
(Written at Hessleholmsgard, in Sweden, between November, 1918, and February, 1919; completed in Berlin by the 23rd of June, the day on which we accepted (!) the Peace.)
- - -
The coup de main at Liège was the first of the series of German victories. The decision was a bold one, and its execution extremely daring.
The campaigns of 1914, 1915 and the summer of 1916 in the East were tremendous achievements, equal to the greatest military feats of any age. They made the highest demands on both commanders and troops. The Russians were then greatly superior in numbers to the allied German and Austro-Hungarian armies opposed to them.
But, indeed, the operations which Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and I had to conduct from the 29th August, 1916, the day we assumed supreme command, rank among the most formidable in history. Nothing more awe-inspiring and destructive has ever been seen on earth. Germany, inferior in numbers and with weak allies, was contending against the world. Decisions of the utmost gravity had to be taken. They were the inevitable and logical result of the situation, our general conception of war, and the particular circumstances of this war.
The armies and fleets fought as they had fought in days past, even though numbers and equipment were mightier than ever before. What made this war different from all others was the manner in which the home populations supported and reinforced their armed forces with all the resources at their disposal. Only in France, in 1870-71, had anything of the kind been seen before.
In this war it was impossible to distinguish where the sphere of the Army and Navy began and that of the people ended. Army and people were one. The world witnessed the War of Nations in the most literal sense of the word. In this mighty concentration of effort the Great Powers of the earth faced each other. And not only between the armed forces did the combat rage along those huge fronts and on distant oceans. The moral and vital force of the civil population was assailed with the purpose of corroding and paralysing them.
With big battalions it is neither difficult nor very risky to wage war and fight battles. But in the first three years of the war the Field-Marshal and I never found ourselves in that enviable position. We could but act as duty and conscience dictated, and adopt the measures we deemed necessary to secure victory. During this period success crowned our efforts.
When, in March, 1918, we attacked with the balance of numbers more in our favour than had previously been the case, our strength sufficed to win great victories, but not to bring about a rapid decision. Then it dwindled, while the enemy grew stronger.
- - -
This world-wide war of nations made enormous demands on us Germans, on whom its whole overwhelming burden fell. Every individual had to give his very utmost, if we were to win. We had literally to fight and work to the last drop of blood and sweat, and yet maintain our fighting spirit and, above all, our confidence in victory: a hard but imperative necessity, in spite of the dearth of food which the enemy imposed on us, and the onslaught of his propaganda, which was of amazing force, if unobtrusive.
Our Army and Navy are rooted in the Nation, as is the oak in German soil. They live upon the homeland, and from it they draw their strength. They can keep, but cannot produce what they need, and can only fight with the moral, material and physical means which the country provides. These means make possible victory, faithful devotion and unselfish self-sacrifice in the daily battle and the miseries of war. They alone could secure Germany's final success. With them our country waged the titanic conflict against the world, even allowing for the assistance of our Allies and the exploitation of occupied territories as far as the laws of land warfare permitted.
The Army and Navy had thus to look to the homeland for their constant renewal and rejuvenation in moral, numbers and equipment.
It was essential to maintain the moral and war spirit of those at home at the highest pitch. Woe to us if they should fail! The longer the war lasted, the greater grew the danger of this, the harder it became to overcome difficulties, and the more imperious were the demands of the Army and Navy for spiritual and moral reinforcement.
The very last resources, both in men and material, had to be made available and devoted to the prosecution of the war.
These were enormous tasks for the country. The homeland was not only the basis on which our proud military power rested, and which must therefore be carefully safeguarded; it was the life-giving source which had to be kept clear, pure and yet potent, lest it lose anything of that virtue wherewith it steeled the nerves and renewed the strength of the Army and Navy. The nation needed those inner spiritual forces which alone enabled it to go on revitalizing the Army and Navy. The spheres of the nation and of the armed forces were so intermingled that it was impossible to separate them. The fighting efficiency of the forces in face of the enemy depended absolutely upon that of the people at home. That meant that everyone at home must work and live for the war in a way that had never been known before. It was for the Government, and the Imperial Chancellor, who was specially responsible, to direct and foster that spirit.
Upon this Minister devolved another important war function: the direction of operations against the enemy's home fronts. Should Germany neglect to use this powerful weapon, the effects of which she daily experienced in her own body? Should we not attack the moral of our enemies in the same way as they were, unfortunately so successfully, attacking ours? This contest had first to be transferred to neutral countries, and thence from front to front. But Germany always lacked one mighty means of propaganda: starvation of the enemy peoples by blockade.
The Government had great problems to solve if the war was to be brought to a successful conclusion. No greater demand has ever been made on a German government than to place the united strength of the German people at the disposal of the Emperor in order to secure victory in the field, and carry on the war against the spirit and moral of the enemy nations. Thus the action and conduct of the Government attained decisive importance. This meant that Government, Reichstag and People must devote themselves utterly to the idea of war that was the only way: the power to wage war had its source at home and was put to the proof at the front.
The great aim of peace could only be attained by relentless prosecution of the war. By working for the war, therefore, the Government at the same time paved the way for peace, to attain which at the first possible moment was their glorious, ultimate goal.
Soon after we were summoned to assume the supreme command, and had time to consider the situation in all its bearings, the Field-Marshal and I laid our views as to the requirements of the Army and Navy before the Imperial Chancellor, and discussed the problems which they raised for the country. We called upon him to co-operate in prosecuting the war, and were buoyed up with hope in spite of the menacing aspect of the situation.
The Government had welcomed our appointment to the supreme command. We met them with frank confidence. Soon, however, two schools of thought, represented by their views and ours, began to come into conflict. This divergence of view was a great disappointment to us and vastly increased our burden.
In Berlin they were unable to accept our opinion as to the necessity of certain war measures, or to steel their wills to the point of magnetizing the whole nation and directing its life and thought to the single idea of war and victory. The great democracies of the Entente did better. With an iron will Gambetta in 1870-71, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George in this war, enrolled their peoples in the service of victory. Our Government failed to recognize this inflexible purpose and the definite intention of the Entente to destroy us. They should never have doubted it. Instead of concentrating all our resources and using them to the utmost in order to achieve peace on the battlefield, as the very nature of war demands, the authorities in Berlin followed a different path: they talked more and more about reconciliation and understanding, without giving our own people a strong warlike impetus at the same time. In Berlin they believed, or deceived themselves into believing, that the hostile nations were longing to hear words of reconciliation and would urge their governments towards peace. So little did they understand the mind of our enemies, both, people and governments, their strong national feeling and unbending will. Berlin had learned nothing from history. They only felt their own impotence in face of the enemy's spirit; they lost the hope of victory and drifted. The desire for peace became stronger than the will to fight for victory. The road to peace was blocked by the will of the enemy, whose aim was our destruction; in seeking it the Government neglected to lead the nation by the hard road to victory.
Reichstag and People found themselves without that strong lead which, generally speaking, they longed for, and slid with the Government down the slippery way. The tremendous questions arising out of the war were more and more thrust on one side, for people's minds were occupied with questions of internal politics and thoughts of self. That meant the ruin of our country, It may be that the revolution which is now shattering Europe may usher in a new world order and make the thoughts and feelings of the nations more ready for a peace of justice and reconciliation. The armistice and peace conditions certainly point the other way. In any case, all the time I was First Quartermaster-General the world had not yet changed.
Our General Staff took the same view as President Wilson, who supported his demand for a great American naval programme on the grounds that it would be absurd for America to adjust her naval programme to a future world policy, when the latter had not yet been decided.
- - -
The astonished world, its ideals shattered, now perceives this clearly. The German people has been misled, and is now paying for its delusion with its life.
- - -
Directly after war broke out, General Headquarters was obliged to take action in connection with several matters which were really the sphere of other authorities. The Press, the censorship, precautions against spies and sabotage at home, dealing with revolutionaries, all these wide fields were left to the unaided efforts of the military authorities, to the detriment of the conduct of the war.
- - -
It became more and more the fashion to hold the General Staff, which in this case meant myself, responsible for our troubles and miseries. For example, my name was associated not only with the unavoidable hardships, but even with some of the abominations of the home rationing system.
- - -
In the winter of 1916-17 I was blamed for the shortage of transport and coal. This was mainly due to insufficient provision having been made before I was appointed to General Headquarters. In February, 1917, I urged the appointment of a Coal Controller. Unfortunately the right man was not discovered at once, and another had to be selected later on. In the summer of 1917 50,000 miners were released by General Headquarters from service at the front. In the winter of 1917-18 house-fuel was more plentiful than in the previous one; but General Headquarters, which had taken decisive measures and was certainly more responsible for the improved situation than for the bad conditions of 1916-17, got neither thanks nor credit.
- - -
Unless we got a peace which safeguarded the existence of our country, the war would be lost. I could not see how peace was possible unless the enemy also was ready for it. I thought it very dangerous for us to be alone in announcing a desire for peace.
- - -
The enemy was not yet broken. When this had been effected by military victory the diplomats might talk about reconciliation - if they still wanted to.
- - -
Mine has been a life of work for our country, the Emperor and the Army. During the four years of war I lived only for the war.
- - -
Deeply moved by the events of the 8th August, 1918, I placed my post at the disposal of the Field-Marshal. There is no question that the terrible disappointments towards the end of the war had worn me out, but my nerves never gave way under the strain.
Mais:
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLrWPsj6fVbeVD5xo_h2O6m1JtXS1Grs5D
* Neste dossiê do jornal O Estado de São Paulo, na parte '1914: Quando horror se alastrou', as legendas das fotos de Ludendorff e Hindenburg estão trocadas. Em 2014 enviei um email avisando sobre o erro. Nunca me responderam.
