Nicholas II had appointed his uncle Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolovich as the commander in chief of Russian forces at the beginning of the war in August 1914. In accordance with the Russian tradition that dated back to Alexander Nevsky, the Grand Duke had reluctantly accepted the appointment after numerous turn downs and wrenching self examinations. Nevertheless, shunning his self professed incompetence, he had launched the vast Russian army against both enemies nearly simultaneously in accordance with plans drawn up between 1910 and 1913 of which he had no prior knowledge. By September, the best laid plans had yielded disaster against the Germans but ripe fruit from the Austro-Hungarians.
Throughout 1914 and the winter months of 1915 the Russian army had fought stubbornly against the Germans maintaining their hold on the Polish salient that jutted like a knife at the throat of Germany. Three times the Germans had attempted to seize the fortress line along the Vistula, and three times the tsarist soldiers had defeated them. Three times the Grand Duke had attempted to invade Germany and each had failed. However, in Galicia, Russian General Alexei Brusilov had pushed his soldiers ever forward to take Lemberg, invest the fortress at Przemysl, and threaten the ancient Polish capital of Krakow and the coal rich German Silesia. His soldiers stood on the summits of the Carpathian Mountains and looked down into the Hungarian plains. The Austro-Hungarian army was hemorrhaging at an alarming rate. One year's casualties rose to nearly 1,500,000 men of which one third were prisoners of war. But the euphoria of victories and successful defenses came to a screeching stop in April 1915.
The Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, had asked the German chief of staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, for help in repelling Russian advances since the first month of the war. Falkenhayn had provided a division here and a brigade there to bolster the dual monarchy's failing lines and even formed two armies to secure its right flank in southern Poland and center in Galicia. Conrad's two attempts in late 1914 and winter 1915 at counter offenses had failed miserably and in March, the besieged men of the fortress of Przemysl had finally given up sending 130,000 men to the Russian prisoner of war camps. His requests for help to the Germans became more insistent. Falkenhayn answered the pleas by planning an offensive along the Galician front between the villages of Gorlice and Tarnow which German units would carry out exclusive of Austro-Hungarian control.
- - -
On 2 May the Central Powers' artillery opened fire on the soldiers in the juncture of the Russian IX and X Corps of the Third Army, a front that was approximately 50 kilometers long. The bombardment lasted a bare four hours but was of such a devastating nature that few survived it.
- - -
As the Russian Third Army fell back under the onslaught of the German heavy artillery so did its neighbors to the right and left. The general staff had a real fear of encirclement.
- - -
One reason why Stavka ordered a withdrawal was the condition of the armies' armaments and munitions. The Russian army had started the war with many deficits in this area. In artillery, bending to the concepts espoused by their French ally for a mobile war effort, the war ministry had decided to concentrate on producing light field pieces which soldiers could move forward quickly in a war of mobility. Larger calibers were seen as defensive weapons. As a result the Russian Third Army had no heavy artillery or were there any heavy pieces in the flanking armies. German heavy artillery, with a longer range than the Russian field pieces, took up position out of their range and pounded them into slag heaps. But the problem was not solely in a lack of cannon. It also resided in a lack of ammunition. [...] Scarcity showed itself by early 1915. Division commanders limited their batteries to using five to ten rounds per day per gun. This lack of ammunition had also reduced battery size from eight guns to six. Russian soldiers took note that the German cannonades were met with silence on the part of their supporting guns. Battery commanders were cautioned to open fire only when the infantry appeared. By then many batteries lay in ruin and the fire from the surviving cannons amounted to only a few salvos followed again by silence as they were either blown up by the heavier, longer range German cannons or because they left the field as useless pieces of war equipment. This shortage went deeper than just the artillery branch.
Another reason to consider an entire front withdrawal was the strength of the army. Casualties had topped the million mark during the early months of 1915. Officer losses by the end of 1914 exceeded the war's beginning strength plus 50 percent more and competent replacements were not coming. Those who had the necessary education avoided service through deferments and promotion from the ranks would have been counterproductive since over 50 percent of the soldiers were illiterate. Noncommissioned officers were in even shorter supply. Third Army's paper strength showed 232, 000 but those who bore the brunt of the Mackensen hammer only amounted to 92,800. Many of the regiments had fewer than 250 bayonets. The constant pleas for replacements from home depots led to recruits arriving in the trenches with as little as three weeks training and weaponless. Although the Russian army had started the war with enough rifles to arm its active and reserve units, there were few replacements. The large number of casualties also meant that an almost equal amount of equipment was lost to the enemy. It was not until April 1915 that Stavka told the corps to organize salvage units that would clean battlefields and trenches of abandon equipment. Many of the tsar's soldiers who had survived the whirlwind bombardments faced the Central Powers' infantry with only a bayonet or a club. Strong rearguards held the Central Powers' soldiers at every river crossing but the enemy's mobile artillery soon rolled up and eliminated the resistance. One Russian general lamented that the Germans used shells to advance while the Russians used men to defend.
- - -
Mackensen's Eleventh Army, supported by the Austro-Hungarian Fourth and Third Army continued their drive across Galicia to retake the fortress at Przemysl. Under the Austrians, the fortress had held out from October 1914 to March 1915. Russian defense lasted a scant few days.
- - -
In early June, the German General Staff changed the direction of the advance. [...]
The German Twelfth Army consisted of seven divisions supported by 860 cannons. It fell on the juncture of the Russian First and Twelfth Armies as Mackensen had done. The bombardment was horrific. The 11 Siberian Division bore the brunt of the attack losing half its strength in 30 minutes. Despite the losses, the first infantry assault was repulsed by survivors who were often without rifles or bullets. Russian artillery with barely 4 rounds per gun available concentrated their fire to support the ill trained and badly equipped soldiers. It was not until nightfall of the first day that the defenders finally gave way and the German drive continued eastward isolating the Vistula River fortresses but not the armies that had been around them.
[...] The general staff had managed to extricate three armies from the German encirclement. The cost was 1.4 million killed or wounded and 976,000 in prisoners of war camps.
Although the Central Powers' drive continued for another month, the fall of the Vistula fortress line along with the loss of the Polish salient by the end of August prompted many critics to call for someone's head. Open letters appeared in newspapers which insinuated that the leadership of Nicholas Nikolovich left much to be desired. Based on this uproar Nicholas II decided that the Grand Duke had to go. On 23 August an ukase announced that the Grand Duke would henceforth command the Russian armies in the Caucasus and the tsar would assume command on the western front. The critics were shocked. They had expected that the tsar would purge the Stavka but not sack its commander. Hurriedly they attempt to try and change the tsar's mind but he refused. Many attribute this steadfastness of the tsar on his wife who was displeased with Nicholas Nikolovich's disparaging remarks toward the tsarina's court favorite monk Rasputin. The conduct of the war had become the sole responsibility of the tsar. The people would blame all future failures on his leadership instead of advisers. This opened the door to the revolution that followed a year and a half later.
Fonte:
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/thegreatretreat.aspx
